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Pneumonia epizootics are a major challenge for management of bighorn sheep (Ovis 
canadensis), often causing high mortality and subsequent long-term impacts that may 
continue for decades. There have been at least 22 epizootics in herds in Montana from 
1979‒2013, including 1 that led to a herd’s extirpation, several that appear to be affecting 
herds up to 3 decades later, and 11 in the last 6 years. The disease is complex and 
associated risk factors are poorly understood. A lack of tools to help predict and 
proactively manage risk of pneumonia epizootics in attempt to prevent die-offs has led to 
reactive rather than proactive management. We developed risk and decision models to 
facilitate proactive management of pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep in Montana. 
Our risk model identifies risk factors and addresses biological questions about risk. We 
used Bayesian logistic regression with repeated measures to analyze 43 herds that 
experienced 22 epizootics out of 637 herd years from 1979–2013. Within an area of high 
risk for pathogen exposure (a herd’s distribution plus a 14.5-km buffer), a herd’s odds of 
a pneumonia epizootic increased >1.5 times per additional unit of private land, >3.3 times 
if domestic sheep or goats were used for weed control, and >10.2 times if the herd or its 
neighbors had a pneumonia epizootic since 1979. A herd at medium density compared to 
low had >5.2 times greater odds of a pneumonia epizootic, and at high density had nearly 
15 times greater odds. Our decision model incorporates predictions from the risk model 
and uses a structured decision making approach to help make more proactive decisions 
about how to best manage herds, given herd-specific probabilities of pneumonia 
epizootics and management objectives. The model addresses uncertainty, risk tolerance, 
and the multi-objective nature of management of bighorn sheep while providing a 
consistent, transparent, and deliberative approach for making decisions. The risk and 
decision models are unique tools that will help wildlife agencies more proactively address 
pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep while providing a case study for developing 
similar tools for proactive management of other wildlife diseases. 
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CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION TO PROACTIVE MANAGEMENT  
OF PNEUMONIA EPIZOOTICS IN BIGHORN SHEEP IN MONTANA 
 
Pneumonia epizootics are a major challenge for successful management and conservation 
of bighorn sheep (Ovis canadensis; Gross et al. 2000, Cahn et al. 2011, Wehausen et al. 
2011, Cassirer et al. 2013, Plowright et al. 2013). Such epizootics often include high 
mortality across all age classes, with implications for persistence of herds, satisfaction of 
stakeholders, and resource allocation by management agencies (Enk et al. 2001, Montana 
Fish, Wildlife and Parks [MFWP] 2010). Long-lasting effects include lamb die-offs and 
other sporadic pneumonia outbreaks that may continue for decades (Enk et al. 2001, 
Cassirer and Sinclair 2007, Cassirer et al. 2013, Plowright et al. 2013) and require 
extensive management such as culling (Edwards et al. 2010), augmentations (MFWP 
2010), and reintroductions (Singer et al. 2000). In some cases, herds may never fully 
recover to pre-epizootic abundance and health (e.g., Enk et al. 2001, MFWP 2010, 
Cassirer et al. 2013, Plowright et al. 2013).  
Due to a lack of tools to predict and proactively manage risk of pneumonia 
epizootics, a reactive “crisis management” response is typical following epizootic events 
(Woodroffe 1999, Mitchell et al. 2013). Despite many previous studies on pneumonia in 
bighorn sheep, risk factors that contribute to pneumonia epizootics remain unclear, as 
does an understanding of how available data are associated with potential risk factors and 
how these data could help predict epizootics. Importantly too, a means to estimate risk 
would not automatically imply appropriate proactive management to reduce that risk. 
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We developed risk and decision models to facilitate proactive management of 
pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep in Montana, based on prototypes from Mitchell et 
al. (2013). Our first objective was to develop an empirical risk model of pneumonia 
epizootics using available data that we hypothesized could contribute to epizootics in 
bighorn sheep. Our second objective was develop a decision model to evaluate 
consequences and trade-offs of potential alternative decisions given predictions of risk 
and the objectives and constraints of managers.  
Our purpose in Chapter 2 was to develop a risk model to predict probability of 
pneumonia epizootics, identify risk factors, and answer biological questions about risk. 
We developed the model by analyzing histories of 43 herds in Montana that experienced 
22 epizootics out of 637 herd years from 1979–2013. Within an area of high risk (herd 
distribution plus a 14.5-km buffer), odds of a pneumonia epizootic increased >1.5-fold 
per additional unit of private land, >3.3-fold when domestic sheep or goats were used for 
weed control in that area, and >10.2-fold if a herd or its neighbors within that area had a 
previous epizootic since 1979. Herds at medium density had >5.2-fold greater risk 
compared to when they were at low density and nearly 15-fold greater risk at high 
density. Through further analysis, we found that odds were 0.4-fold per additional unit of 
spring precipitation, as well. Our risk model provides 1-year predictions of probability of 
a pneumonia epizootic, from which long-term predictions can be calculated for use in the 
decision model. 
Our purpose in Chapter 3 was to design and demonstrate a decision model to 
identify the best way to manage risk of pneumonia epizootics and clarify the decision 
based on structured decision making (Gregory et al. 2012, Conroy and Peterson 2013, 
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Mitchell et al. 2013). Structured decision making (SDM) helps identify deliberative, 
transparent, and defensible management actions most likely to achieve desired outcomes 
while accounting for multiple competing objectives, uncertainty, and risk tolerance 
(Gregory et al. 2012, Conroy and Peterson 2013). Using the decision model, decision-
makers can develop portfolios of potential management alternatives for their herds, 
predict risk, estimate consequences, identify risk attitude, determine weights for 
objectives, and calculate overall support and trade-offs for each portfolio to identify the 
recommended decision. In an analysis of representative herds, the model recommended 
various types of proactive decisions to reduce risk. These decisions were relatively 
insensitive to the model components we tested, meaning the recommended decisions 
were robust and would be the best means to manage herds based on herd-specific risk, 
objectives, and consequences.  
The risk and decision models are unique tools that will help wildlife agencies 
more proactively manage risk of pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep. We designed 
the models with a simple user interface for independent use, without a need for statistical 
expertise, SDM expertise, or meetings and working groups typically relied upon for 
SDM-based decision-making. An adaptive management approach will continuously 
improve the models in the future and adapt them to local conditions as needed (Gregory 
et al. 2012, Conroy and Peterson 2013). Ultimately, too, the models are examples of the 
roles of risk and decision models for wildlife management. They provide a case study and 
foundation for future modeling efforts that will ultimately yield a more effective 
approach to address diverse management challenges, particularly wildlife disease issues. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
MODELING RISK OF PNEUMONIA EPIZOOTICS IN BIGHORN SHEEP 
 
ABSTRACT Pneumonia epizootics are a major challenge for management of bighorn 
sheep (Ovis canadensis) affecting persistence of herds, satisfaction of stakeholders, and 
allocations of resources by management agencies. Risk factors associated with the 
disease are poorly understood, making pneumonia epizootics hard to predict; such 
epizootics are thus managed reactively rather than proactively. We developed a model for 
herds in Montana that identifies risk factors and addresses biological questions about risk. 
Using Bayesian logistic regression with repeated measures, we found that private land, 
weed control using domestic sheep or goats, pneumonia history, and herd density were 
positively associated with risk of pneumonia epizootics in 43 herds that experienced 22 
epizootics out of 637 herd-years from 1979–2013. We defined an area of high risk for 
pathogen exposure as the area of each herd distribution plus a 14.5-km buffer from that 
boundary. Within this area, the odds of a pneumonia epizootic increased by >1.5 times 
per additional unit of private land (unit is the standardized % of private land where global 
x̅ = 25.58% and SD = 14.53%). Odds were >3.3 times greater if domestic sheep or goats 
were used for weed control in a herd’s area of high risk. If a herd or its neighbors within 
the area of high risk had a history of a pneumonia epizootic, odds of a subsequent 
pneumonia epizootic were >10 times greater. Risk greatly increased when herds were at 
high density, with nearly 15 times greater odds of a pneumonia epizootic compared to 
when herds were at low density. Odds of a pneumonia epizootic also appeared to 
decrease following increased spring precipitation (odds = 0.41 per unit increase, global x̅ 
This is the accepted version of the following article: Sells, S. N., M. S. Mitchell, J. J. Nowak, P. M. Lukacs, N. J. Anderson, J. M. 
Ramsey, J. A. Gude, and P. R. Krausman. 2015. Modeling risk of pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep. Journal of Wildlife 
Management 79:2, which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/(ISSN)1937-2817. 
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= 100.18% and SD = 26.97%). Risk was not associated with number of federal sheep and 
goat allotments, proximity to nearest herds of bighorn sheep, ratio of rams to ewes, 
percentage of average winter precipitation, or whether herds were of native versus mixed 
or reintroduced origin. We conclude that factors associated with risk of pneumonia 
epizootics are complex and may not always be from the most obvious sources. The 
ability to identify high-risk herds will help biologists and managers determine where to 
focus management efforts and the risk factors that most affect each herd, facilitating more 
effective, proactive management.  
INTRODUCTION 
Pneumonia epizootics present an important challenge for effective management of 
bighorn sheep (Ovis canadensis; Gross et al. 2000, Cahn et al. 2011, Wehausen et al. 
2011, Cassirer et al. 2013, Plowright et al. 2013). Once pneumonia pathogens are 
introduced to a population of bighorn sheep, initial all-age mortality can exceed 80% 
(Enk et al. 2001, Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks [MFWP] 2010). The pathogens also 
may become endemic, resulting in pneumonia outbreaks that can cycle for years to 
decades (Enk et al. 2001, Cassirer and Sinclair 2007, Cassirer et al. 2013, Plowright et al. 
2013). Of critical concern, lamb recruitment often remains chronically low for many 
years following an epizootic, which further threatens a herd’s long-term persistence, 
particularly if pre-epizootic abundance was low, mortality rates were high, or other 
stochastic events (e.g., environmental or demographic) occur that further suppress or 
push the herd to extinction (Woodroffe 1999, Singer et al. 2000c, Cassirer and Sinclair 
2007, Cassirer et al. 2013, Plowright et al. 2013). Herds may require extensive 
management to recover, including removal of diseased individuals (Edwards et al. 2010), 
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augmentation from other herds (MFWP 2010), or reintroductions (Singer et al. 2000b). 
Despite great outlays of time and expense in attempt to restore herds after a pneumonia 
epizootic, they may never fully recover to pre-epizootic abundance and health (e.g., Enk 
et al. 2001, MFWP 2010, Cassirer et al. 2013, Plowright et al. 2013).  
Identifying causes and influences of pneumonia epizootics has been the goal of 
extensive study; the etiology remains poorly understood, however, and the need for 
further research is commonly cited (Monello et al. 2001; Cassaigne et al. 2010; Miller et 
al. 2011, 2012). Presence of certain pathogens such as Mycoplasma ovipneumoniae and 
Mannheimia haemolytica are likely indicative of risk (Miller et al. 2011; Besser et al. 
2012a, b, 2013; Shanthalingam et al. 2014). After decades of research, however, 
relationships between the various known and hypothesized risk factors affecting 
transmission, spread, and susceptibility of the pathogens that lead to pneumonia remain 
unclear. A single risk factor associated with all pneumonia epizootics has yet to be found, 
if it exists (Miller et al. 2012). Elucidation of risk factors and novel management tools for 
this complicated, much-debated management challenge and serious threat to persistence 
of herds of bighorn sheep are much needed.  
The central role of domestic sheep and goats in exposure to pathogens is well 
documented; pathogen transmission from domestic to bighorn sheep is the only supported 
hypothesis in experimental trials (Wehausen et al. 2011). Healthy captive bighorn sheep 
sicken and die when penned with domestic sheep (Foreyt and Jessup 1982, Onderka and 
Wishart 1988, Foreyt 1989, Lawrence et al. 2010) or after accidental contact with 
domestic sheep (Foreyt and Jessup 1982). Analysis of pathogens in epizootics of free-
ranging bighorn sheep also supports the hypothesis that pathogens are transmitted 
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between Old World Caprinae species and immunologically naïve bighorn sheep (Besser 
et al. 2012b, 2013). Proximity of bighorn sheep to grazing allotments with domestic 
sheep is associated with increased susceptibility to pneumonia (Monello et al. 2001) and 
decreased persistence of the herd over time (Singer et al. 2000b, 2001; Epps et al. 2004; 
Clifford et al. 2009; Carpenter et al. 2014). Contact with feral goats also appears to result 
in exposure to pathogens (Rudolph et al. 2003). Contact with sheep or goats on 
commercial and hobby farms or when sheep or goats are used for weed control (i.e., 
targeted grazing to manage noxious weeds) may result in exposure to pathogens (Miller 
et al. 2011, 2012; Wild Sheep Working Group 2012). Evidence also suggests herds of 
bighorn sheep are likely more interconnected than previously thought (Singer et al. 
2000a, DeCesare and Pletscher 2006), and that proximity among herds may increase risk 
of exposure to pneumonia pathogens through such connectivity (Onderka and Wishart 
1984, George et al. 2008, Edwards et al. 2010, Besser et al. 2013).  
Conditions other than comingling between bighorn sheep and domestic sheep or 
goats may be associated with spread of and susceptibility to pneumonia pathogens, 
because comingling does not always quickly lead to pneumonia epizootics and some 
epizootics occur without known or confirmed contact (e.g., Onderka and Wishart 1984, 
George et al. 2008, Edwards et al. 2010). Rams have a greater tendency than ewes to 
make long movements (Singer et al. 2000b, DeCesare and Pletscher 2006, O’Brien et al. 
2014), probably more so at relatively high densities (Singer et al. 2000a, Monello et al. 
2001). Such movements increase their risk of contacting domestic sheep or other infected 
herds and spreading pathogens upon return to their own herds (Onderka and Wishart 
1984, George et al. 2008, Besser et al. 2013). High densities of bighorn sheep may also 
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result in high rates of contact between individuals, increasing the rate of spread of 
pathogens (Monello et al. 2001, Lafferty and Gerber 2002, Clifford et al. 2009). Disease 
processes can also be influenced by complex environmental interactions, including those 
that may place stress on the health and immune response of animals (Scott 1988, 
Wobeser 2006). Harsh winters have been associated with disease events (Monello et al. 
2001, MFWP 2010), and pneumonia incidence increases in the fall and winter (Cassirer 
and Sinclair 2007). Harsher winter conditions may stress animals by affecting energy 
budgets or reducing access to adequate forage (Goodson et al. 1991, Butler et al. 2013). 
Low precipitation has been linked to lower lamb survival (Portier et al. 1998) and to herd 
extinctions (Epps et al. 2004), perhaps because dry growing seasons might increase 
susceptibility to disease through decreased forage quality (Enk et al. 2001, Monello et al. 
2001). Herds that are augmented or reintroduced appear to be at higher risk of pneumonia 
than native herds, perhaps because of factors associated with reintroduction, the source 
herd, or the possibility that sites where herds were previously extirpated are more risky 
for pneumonia than where herds have not died out (Monello et al. 2001, Rudolph et al. 
2007, Plowright et al. 2013).  
Several models have been developed to simulate impacts of pneumonia from 
exposure to allotments, distance to domestic sheep, or contact with nearby infected herds 
of bighorn sheep and to predict population size, mortality rates, or herd persistence in 
relation to pneumonia (Gross et al. 2000, Clifford et al. 2009, Cassaigne et al. 2010, Cahn 
et al. 2011, Carpenter et al. 2014). Recent models also estimate the overall probability of 
transitioning between healthy and all-age, lamb-only, or adult-only pneumonia (Cassirer 
et al. 2013) and immune response by modeling how pneumonia exposure affects an 
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individual’s risk of dying from pneumonia (Plowright et al. 2013). Another recent model 
estimates probability of contact between individual bighorn sheep and allotments with 
domestic sheep and goats (O’Brien et al. 2014). Several models simulate the effect of 
management actions, primarily focused on changing management of grazing allotments 
(Clifford et al. 2009, Cahn et al. 2011, Carpenter et al. 2014) as well as modifying 
habitat, colonization of new patches, or impacts of stochastic events (Gross et al. 2000). 
These models predict the consequences of epizootics, but none predict risk of epizootics 
for individual herds (but see Clifford et al. [2009] and Carpenter et al. [2014]). 
Despite the breadth of previous studies on pneumonia in bighorn sheep, state 
wildlife agencies generally do not have a clear understanding of risk factors contributing 
to epizootics in herds they manage, how data available to them might be associated with 
such risk factors, or how these data might be used to predict epizootics. Agencies need 
risk assessment models to help prioritize herds and allocate limited resources to 
proactively manage risk of disease (Mitchell et al. 2013). Such a model should capture 
variability across the range of environmental conditions in which managed herds exist; 
models developed under more limited spatial or temporal extents may have little 
predictive power. Without such models, management of pneumonia epizootics in bighorn 
sheep has historically been reactive, resulting in crisis management rather than proactive 
prevention (Woodroffe 1999).  
To begin addressing this issue, Mitchell et al. (2013) developed a preliminary 
pneumonia risk model and proactive decision model for bighorn sheep in Montana. The 
goal of the risk model was to predict the likelihood of pneumonia epizootics for herds 
managed by Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks (MFWP). The predictions were then used 
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to inform the decision model designed to facilitate proactive management decisions given 
the objectives and constraints of managers. Their risk model was based only on expert 
opinion of biologists and managers and did not attempt to empirically quantify risk 
factors associated with pneumonia epizootics. Our objective, therefore, was to develop an 
empirical risk model of pneumonia epizootics using readily available data that we 
hypothesized could contribute to epizootics in bighorn sheep, based on previous work. 
Our model was designed to facilitate making herd-specific predictions and decisions 
regarding epizootic risk as part of comprehensive statewide management of bighorn 
sheep herds in Montana (Fig. 2.1). We used decision curve analysis (Vickers and Elkin 
2006, Steyerberg et al. 2010) to evaluate the capacity of our model to inform such 
decisions. This analysis allowed us to assess our model’s relative capacity for separating 
high-risk herds from low-risk herds and the relative merits of using reactive or proactive 
management of all herds in the absence of a predictive model.  
STUDY AREA 
Populations of bighorn sheep are found in western Montana and in portions of the 
Missouri Breaks in central Montana (Fig. 2.1). Habitat characteristics vary widely across 
these regions. Elevations range from 600 m to 4,000 m (MFWP 2010). Northwestern 
Montana is characterized by dense forests and generally rugged and mountainous terrain 
with a climate typical of the Pacific Northwest. Southwestern Montana is characterized 
by rolling foothills and rugged mountains, with heavier snow cover on western aspects, 
rain shadows on eastern aspects, and shrubs and bunchgrasses leading to conifers and 
alpine vegetation at increasing elevations. West-central Montana is characterized by low 
rolling hills and rugged mountain canyons, with a transitional mix of climate 
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characteristics typical of southwestern and eastern Montana. South-central Montana 
includes sheer mountain canyons and rolling hills with shrub desert, montane forest, 
intermountain grasslands, alpine plateaus, and widely varying climates. The Missouri 
Breaks is semiarid with flat or rolling benchlands, rugged badlands, riparian areas, and 
ponderosa pine (Pinus ponderosa) savannahs. Federal sheep and goat grazing allotments 
have been distributed throughout Montana for the past 3 decades except in the 
northwestern region. Weed control with domestic sheep and goats has occurred 
throughout the state, as have commercial and hobby farms on private lands that can 
include domestic sheep and goats.  
METHODS 
Survey Data for Bighorn Sheep 
We developed a disease risk model using survey and management data for 43 of 52 
bighorn sheep herds in Montana from 1979 to 2013 (9 herds were not consistently 
monitored). We selected 1979 as the preliminary year because data from monitoring 
surveys and pneumonia epizootics were rare prior to that time. We defined a herd as a 
group of bighorn sheep that generally form a spatially and demographically distinct group 
(Wells and Richmond 1995). Not all 43 herds were extant in all years; 9 were established 
after 1979, 1 of which was extirpated after a pneumonia epizootic. Survey data included 
air and ground observations of bighorn sheep counts, age classifications, and sex 
classifications collected at intervals that varied from intermittent to annual, depending on 
the herd. These observations were primarily collected by MFWP (>90% of all years 
surveyed). Additional observations were collected jointly between MFWP and the 
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes (CSKT; <3%), by the CSKT (<2%), or in 
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association with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (<4%), Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM; <1%), or the University of Montana (<1%; Fralick 1984). 
We defined herd-year as 1 July to 30 June following MFWP’s definition for a 
management year, which encompasses a complete reproductive cycle from breeding 
through lambing. We defined a pneumonia epizootic as a die-off with ≥25% mortality 
(Young 1994) caused by pneumonia (n = 22; Fig. 2.1) based on data and expertise from 
herd biologists and disease specialists at the MFWP Wildlife Laboratory. We included 
mortalities due to culling of symptomatic bighorn sheep during verified pneumonia 
events (Edwards et al. 2010). Pneumonia was generally confirmed by necropsy and 
histological examination of lung tissue, culture, and/or pathology reports (n = 18). One 
die-off was attributed to pneumonia based on biologist knowledge and information 
presented in Enk et al. (2001). When carcasses or biological samples were unavailable 
from an epizootic event (n = 3), pneumonia was determined based on other evidence 
(drops of ≥25% in survey numbers, numerous reports of symptomatic individuals, reports 
of carcasses, and detection of Mycoplasma ovipneumoniae in survivors the year 
following the die-offs; Brent Lonner, MFWP, unpublished data). For each herd 
experiencing a pneumonia epizootic (n = 18), we excluded the 3 following herd-years 
from analysis because most herds continued to experience noticeable mortality rates in 
the few years immediately following the preliminary epizootic year (MFWP 2010). We 
also excluded all herd-years following a pneumonia epizootic if a herd was augmented 
with animals from other herds because the need for augmentation meant that the herd was 
not recovering well, and the addition of animals confounded mortality rates and signs of 
recovery from the epizootic (n = 5 herds). We excluded herd-years where die-offs were 
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caused by winter storms (n = 1) or unknown factors (n = 2). As with the 3 herd-years 
after pneumonia epizootics, we excluded the 3 herd-years following die-offs caused by 
unknown factors because they may have been pneumonia epizootic events.  
Conceivably, pneumonia epizootics could have gone undetected between 1979 
and 2013. To address this possibility and separate years with pneumonia epizootics from 
those without, we calculated percentage change in survey counts between consecutive 
herd-years for each herd. We classified herd-years as free of pneumonia epizootics by the 
following criteria: 1) for herds surveyed annually, the herd had grown, declined <25%, or 
declined ≥25% followed by ≥200% growth the next year; 2) when surveys occurred 
every 2 years, the herd grew between surveys; and 3) when surveys occurred every 3 
years, the herd grew by ≥200% between surveys. When calculating percentage change, 
we excluded harvested animals, documented vehicle mortalities, and additions and 
removals due to transplantation to analyze unexplained change only. Out of 1,333 herd-
years available, we used 637 (x̅ = 14.8 herd-yr per herd, SD = 8.65, range = 1–34) for 
analysis including the 22 herd-years with pneumonia epizootics. Largely because of a 
lack of survey data, we excluded remaining herd-years from analysis because of 
uncertainty of whether herd-years could safely be classified as free of epizootics.  
Risk Factor Covariates  
We selected 10 covariates we hypothesized were predictive of pneumonia epizootics in 
Montana and for which sufficient data were available. Many covariates were spatial, 
based on herd distributions, so we obtained agency records and elicited expert opinion of 
agency biologists to delineate approximate boundaries of distributions of herds in each 
herd-year (Conroy and Peterson 2013). We categorized each covariate as a potential risk 
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factor we hypothesized could primarily contribute to 1) risk of exposure to pathogens, 2) 
risk of spread of pathogens, or 3) susceptibility to pneumonia epizootics (Mitchell et al. 
2013).  
Risk of exposure to pathogens.—We hypothesized 5 covariates were positively 
related to risk of pathogen transmission: proximity to number of domestic sheep and goat 
allotments (Singer et al. 2000b, 2001; Monello et al. 2001; Epps et al. 2004; Clifford et 
al. 2009), amount of private land (Miller et al. 2011, 2012; Wild Sheep Working Group 
2012), use of domestic sheep and goats for weed control (Miller et al. 2012, Wild Sheep 
Working Group 2012), a history of a pneumonia epizootic in the herd or its neighbors 
(Onderka and Wishart 1984, George et al. 2008, Edwards et al. 2010, Besser et al. 2013), 
and close proximity to other herds (Onderka and Wishart 1984, Singer et al. 2000a, 
George et al. 2008, Edwards et al. 2010, Besser et al. 2013). We hypothesized that 
amount of private land would be representative of risk from hobby or commercial farms 
with domestic sheep or goats, for which data were not available. For each herd, we 
estimated an area of high risk for pathogen exposure (distribution of the herd plus a 14.5-
km buffer from that perimeter; Wild Sheep Working Group 2012) using a geographical 
information system (GIS; ArcMap 10.1, Environmental Systems Research Institute, Inc., 
Redlands, CA). For the first 4 covariates, we modeled risk of pathogen exposure within 
each area of high risk using 1) number of federally managed sheep and goat allotments, 
2) percentage of private land, 3) knowledge of the wildlife biologist responsible for the 
herd regarding the use of domestic sheep or goats for weed control, and 4) history of a 
pneumonia epizootic in the herd in a previous herd-year, or a current or previous 
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pneumonia epizootic in a neighboring herd within the area of high risk. We calculated 
average proximity to the 3 closest herds for the covariate of herd proximity.  
We interviewed personnel and consulted records of federal and state agencies to 
gather data on allotments, private land, weed control, neighbor risk, and herd proximity 
(Table 2.1). For data on allotments, we interviewed agency personnel and obtained BLM 
allotment bills from 1988 onward from the Rangeland Administration System (RAS). We 
obtained associated geospatial data on allotments from each agency and determined the 
number of allotment boundaries intersected by each area of high risk using a GIS (x̅ = 
0.54, SD = 1.32 for 565 herd-yr with allotment data). For private land, we obtained land 
ownership data and calculated the amount of private land within each area of high risk 
using a GIS (x̅ = 25.58, SD = 14.53%). We obtained weed control data through elicitation 
of expert opinion of agency biologists (13.97% of herd-yr had known weed control; 
Conroy and Peterson 2013). We obtained neighbor risk and herd proximity data through 
agency records and elicitation of expert opinion of agency biologists. For neighbor risk, 
when a herd experienced a pneumonia epizootic we assumed neighboring herds were at 
risk for that and subsequent herd-years. We also assumed a recurring risk to the initial 
herd in all subsequent herd-years (19.31% of herd-yr had neighbor risk). For herd 
proximity, we calculated the shortest distance to the perimeters of the distributions of the 
nearest 3 bighorn sheep herds using a GIS and then calculated the average of those 
distances (global x̅ = 22.65 km, SD = 24.27 km). We considered distributions from all 
herds (including the 9 in Montana excluded from our primary analysis and several herds 
in British Columbia, Idaho, and Wyoming) for our covariates of neighbor risk if they 
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were within the area of high risk and herd proximity if they were 1 of the 3 closest herds 
to any of our 43 primary herds.  
Risk of spread of pathogens.—We hypothesized high ram:ewe ratios represented 
increased risk of rams wandering, encountering, and spreading pathogens (Onderka and 
Wishart 1984, Singer et al. 2000a, Monello et al. 2001, George et al. 2008, Besser et al. 
2013), and that higher relative density increased risk through greater rates of spread of 
pathogens (Monello et al. 2001, Lafferty and Gerber 2002, Clifford et al. 2009). We 
obtained herd survey data from the Montana Bighorn Sheep Conservation Strategy 
(MFWP 2010) and directly from biologists (Table 2.1). For ram:ewe ratios (x̅ = 0.65, SD 
= 0.39), we excluded ratios from analysis where <80% of observed animals were 
classified by sex, recorded ratios did not match adults counted, or <1 ram or ewe was 
counted (n = 50 excluded ratios associated with included herd-yr). To estimate herd 
density in each year, we divided the total number of animals counted by the area of the 
herd’s distribution. We then calculated average density, yearly percentage of average 
density, and the range in percentage of average density for each herd. We assigned each 
herd’s density estimate into 3 equally sized bins of low, medium, and high based on the 
percentage of average density relative to their 1979–2013 range. Thus, each set of cut-
offs were herd-specific, based on historical densities of each herd (x̅ cut-off for low 
density ≤ 92.15% of average, SD = 13.15; x̅ cut-off for medium density ≤ 151.11% of 
average, SD = 31.02; 43.80% herd-yr had low density, 36.42% medium, and 19.78% 
high). When density estimates were not available for years without pneumonia 
epizootics, we excluded those herd-years from analysis (n = 65 of excluded herd-yr). 
When density estimates were unavailable for years with pneumonia epizootics (n = 3), we 
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used the most recent density estimate prior to the epizootic (n = 2), or estimated density 
based on reports of percent declines (n = 1). We used a 1-year lag for both covariates 
because surveys were usually done in spring and thus represented the minimum number 
of animals likely to be present at the start of the following herd-year. 
Susceptibility to pneumonia epizootics.—We hypothesized that relatively harsh 
winters contributed to susceptibility to pneumonia epizootics by draining energy budgets 
(Goodson et al. 1991, Monello et al. 2001, Butler et al. 2013). We used percentage of 30-
year normal precipitation to represent winter severity. We hypothesized that relatively 
dry springs contributed to susceptibility to pneumonia epizootics by decreasing forage 
quality (Portier et al. 1998, Enk et al. 2001, Monello et al. 2001, Epps et al. 2004) and 
used percentage of 30-year normal precipitation to represent dry spring conditions. 
Lastly, we hypothesized that mixed (i.e., native herds augmented with animals from other 
populations) or non-native (reintroduced) herds had increased susceptibility to 
pneumonia epizootics because these sites might be more risky if conditions that 
contributed to a previous herd reduction or extirpation persisted in the area (Monello et 
al. 2001). For winter and spring precipitation, we calculated percentage of normal 
precipitation using a GIS to determine monthly PRISM precipitation values and 1980–
2010 Normals (PRISM Climate Group, Corvallis, Oregon) in each delineated herd 
distribution (winter x̅ = 98.68%, SD = 30.16%; spring x̅ = 100.18%, SD = 26.97%). 
Similar to Butler et al. (2013) but because spring lambing season began in April in some 
herds, we considered winter to be 1 November–31 March, and spring 1 April–30 June. 
We used a 1-year lag for both effects to capture the influence of the most recent winter 
and spring on the next herd-year (Portier et al. 1998, Butler et al. 2013). For herd origin, 
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we obtained agency transplant records (Table 2.1) to determine in each herd-year if herds 
were native (21.82% of herd-yr), mixed (20.25%), or reintroduced (57.93%). 
Development of Risk Model 
Analysis of competing models.—We developed 30 a priori models to test how our 
hypothesized risk factors predicted pneumonia epizootics (Appendix). We analyzed the 
models in a Bayesian framework to allow for modeling of missing values and associated 
uncertainty and to simplify the use of herd-level random effects due to repeated 
measurements (Kéry 2010). We centered and scaled covariate data and tested for 
correlations between continuous covariates; we did not include covariates with >40% 
correlation in the same model (Dormann et al. 2013). We used JAGS (Version 3.3.0, 
http://mcmc-jags.sourceforge.net, accessed 14 Mar 2013) called through R (Version 
2.13.1, www.r-project.org, accessed 10 Sep 2011) using the package R2jags (Version 
0.02–17, http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=R2jags, accessed 14 Mar 2013) to run the 
logistic regression models (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000) from these data, with repeated 
measures and a random effect for herd (Gelman and Hill 2007, Royle and Dorazio 2008, 
Kéry 2010). We used vague, uniform priors for all parameters (Link et al. 2002). We 
modeled missing values for ram:ewe ratios (n = 84) and number of domestic sheep and 
goat allotments (n = 72) by setting priors equal to the herd mean where available or the 
global mean otherwise. We ran 100,000 Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) iterations 
with 3 chains, discarding the first 25,000 iterations as burn-in (Link et al. 2002). We 
evaluated convergence of the MCMC simulation with the Gelman and Rubin 
convergence diagnostic (R̂; Brooks and Gelman 1998) and visual inspection of the 
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posteriors and chains for mixing (Link and Barker 2010) to ensure convergence for 
accurate estimates of parameters.  
We identified top models based on Deviance Information Criterion (DIC; 
Spiegelhalter et al. 2002). We excluded models >10 ∆DIC from further consideration. 
We considered covariates within each model to be fully supported if the 95% credibility 
interval posterior densities (CRIs; Kéry 2010) did not include 0. Where 95% CRIs 
included 0, we identified the broadest CRI that would exclude 0 to investigate uncertainty 
of the covariate.  
We used a spreadsheet to calculate probability of a pneumonia epizootic for each 
herd using the parameter estimates from the top models and covariate data from each 
herd. The risk model provided probability of a pneumonia epizootic in any given year. 
We calculated probability of ≥1 epizootic occurring in the next 10 years as {1 − [1 −
Pr(Epizootic
1-yr
)]10} (Mood et al. 1974). 
Assessment of model fit and usefulness.—We used decision curve analysis (DCA; 
Vickers and Elkin 2006, Steyerberg et al. 2010) to compare net benefits of the top models 
(<10 ∆DIC) to estimate fit of each model to the data and usefulness of the model. This 
method allowed assessment of whether the top models were useful compared to totally 
reactive (i.e., treat all herds as low risk) or totally proactive (i.e., treat all herds as high 
risk) management of all herds, and the relative consequences of wrong predictions, which 
is important because a false negative prediction is arguably more harmful for 
conservation and public enjoyment of bighorn sheep than a false positive prediction. For 
each model, risk of a pneumonia epizootic could be classified as high if it exceeded a pre-
defined threshold probability (p
t
). We evaluated a range of p
t
 (0 to the value of the max. 
 
 22 
predicted probability of pneumonia epizootic for the 637 herd-yr from each model) for 
which we calculated sensitivity, specificity, and net benefits, 
net benefitmodel= 
true positive count
𝑛
 − 
false positive count
𝑛
 × (
p
t
1 − p
t
) 
to estimate and summarize performance and advantages of the model, where n = 637. 
Weighting by the ratio p
t
(1 − p
t
)⁄  accounts for the harm of false positive predictions to 
harm of false negative predictions at each p
t
. For each model, we plotted decision curves 
of the net benefits across values of p
t
 to identify the best model that tended to have higher 
net benefits than the others.  
Finally, we determined if the best model was more useful than abandoning the 
model and instead managing all herds as low risk, which is a management option in 
absence of a predictive model. We calculated the model advantage across the range of 
p
t
 over the option of assuming all herds are low risk as: 
net increase in true positives = net benefitmodel × 100 
This measure of the model’s usefulness calculates the increase in true positives with no 
increase in false positive per 100 estimates compared to treating all herds as low risk. 
Similarly, the model advantage across the range of p
t
 over the option of assuming all 
herds are high risk is: 
net reduction in false positives =
(net benefitmodel −  net benefitall high) × 100
p
t
(1 − p
t
)⁄
 
The net reduction in false positives is the reduction of false positives per 100 estimates 
provided by the risk model without increasing the number of false negatives compared to 
abandoning the model and treating all herds as high risk. Here, net benefitall high is 
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calculated with the net benefitmodel formula except true positive count is the total number 
of pneumonia epizootic cases (22) and false positive count the total non-pneumonia 
epizootic cases (615).  
Second generation model.—We developed an a posteriori, second generation 
model by calculating the inclusion probability of each covariate. Inclusion probabilities 
resulted from introducing a Bernoulli distributed indicator variable with probability equal 
to 0.5 (Ntzoufras 2009). We ran 3 chains for 500,000 iterations, discarding the first 
125,000 iterations as burn-in (Link et al. 2002). We calculated the proportion of times 
each indicator variable assumed a value of 1 and identified covariates with inclusion 
probabilities >0.15 (similar to Ntzoufras 2009). We then evaluated a new second 
generation model with these covariates using the techniques described above for analysis 
of competing models. 
RESULTS 
Development of Risk Model 
The top-ranked model included private land, weed control, neighbor risk, and density 
(Table 2.2). The posterior density CRIs excluded 0 except for private land (95% CRI, –
0.03 ≤ x ≤ 0.91), but a 93% CRI for private land excluded 0 (0.01 ≤ x ≤ 0.87). The 
second best model included neighbor risk and density (∆DIC = 6.9). Smooth unimodal 
posteriors, history plots (Link and Barker 2010), and R̂ values of <1.1 indicated 
convergence (Brooks and Gelman 1998). All other models had ∆DIC > 10, so we 
excluded them from further consideration.  
The top-ranked model was superior to the second-ranked model based on 
sensitivity, specificity, and net benefits. Sensitivity and specificity were simultaneously 
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maximized for the top model at a p
t
 of 0.0312, achieving 81.8% sensitivity, 80.2% 
specificity, and a correct overall classification rate of 80.2% (Fig. 2.2). Sensitivity and 
specificity for the second best model were simultaneously maximized at a p
t
 of 0.0288 
with 81.8% sensitivity, 75.3% specificity, and 75.5% correct overall classification rate. 
We selected the top model as the final risk model because it had a higher overall net 
benefit than the second model across most p
t
’s (Fig. 2.3).  
Based on DCA, over a wide range of p
t
 the final risk model was superior to the 2 
alternative options of treating all herds reactively or proactively in absence of a predictive 
model. The risk model’s decision curve had higher net benefits than the decision curve 
for the alternative of treating all herds as high risk at a p
t
 of approximately ≥0.001 (Fig. 
2.3). The risk model’s decision curve was also higher than the decision curve for treating 
all as low risk at a p
t
 of approximately ≤0.389. Between 0.001–0.389, the risk model 
would therefore provide both a net reduction in false positive estimates over assuming all 
herds are high risk and a net increase in true positives over assuming all herds are low 
risk. Using the risk model with any p
t
 between these levels would be better than fully 
reactive management or the alternative of total proactive management of all herds, 
considering limited resources. It is therefore useful as a model for predicting risk of 
pneumonia epizootics at any p
t
 within this range. The model would yield fewer false 
negative predictions at low values of p
t
 and fewer false positive predictions at high values 
of p
t
 (Table 2.3).  
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Effect Sizes for Top Model  
Parameters in the risk model provide estimated effects of each risk factor on probability 
of a pneumonia epizootic. Holding other parameters constant, the odds of a pneumonia 
epizootic increased 1.54 (95% CRI, 0.97 ≤ x ≤ 2.48) times per additional unit of private 
land within the area of high risk (global x̅ = 25.58%, SD = 14.53%). Herds where 
domestic sheep or goats were known to be used to control weeds within the area of high 
risk that year had 3.35 (95% CRI, 1.12 ≤ x ≤ 9.59) times greater odds of a pneumonia 
epizootic than those without. Odds of a pneumonia epizootic were 10.29 (95% CRI, 3.79 
≤ x ≤ 29.73) times greater for herds if they or their neighbors in the area of high risk 
previously experienced a pneumonia epizootic. Herds at medium or high density had 
odds of a pneumonia epizootic 5.26 (95% CRI, 1.36 ≤ x ≤ 24.05) and 14.86 (95% CRI, 
3.79 ≤ x ≤ 70.74) times greater, respectively, than when they were at low density. 
Altogether, a herd with no private land, weed control, or neighbor risk and with low 
density was estimated to have 0.0009 (95% CRI, 0.0001≤ x ≤ 0.0045) probability of a 
pneumonia epizootic during any year and represents the least risky extreme. On the most 
risky extreme, a herd in an area of high risk with 100% private land, weed control, 
neighbor risk, and high density was estimated to have 0.8992 (95% CRI, 0.4256 ≤ x ≤ 
0.9910) annual probability of a pneumonia epizootic.  
Second Generation Model 
Inclusion probabilities were >0.15 for private land, weed control, neighbor risk, and 
density, which aligns with the top model we developed a priori. A fifth and final 
covariate with >0.15 inclusion probability was spring precipitation. An a posteriori model 
with these 5 covariates had a DIC of 4 lower than that of our original best model, 
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indicating greater support for the new model. Parameter estimates of the original 4 risk 
factors were very similar (Tables 2.2 and 2.4).  
Spring precipitation was negatively correlated with probability of a pneumonia 
epizootic the next herd-year (starting 1 Jul). Holding other parameters constant, odds of a 
pneumonia epizootic were 0.41 (95% CRI, 0.20 ≤ x ≤ 0.78) times that of years of average 
spring precipitation per standardized unit increase (x̅ = 100.18%, SD = 26.97%). Thus, 
each increase of 27% from average precipitation was associated with less than half the 
odds of a pneumonia epizootic compared to years with average spring precipitation. 
Conversely, for each unit decrease in spring rainfall, risk of a pneumonia epizootic more 
than doubled.       
DISCUSSION 
Historically, state wildlife agencies have managed pneumonia epizootics in bighorn 
sheep largely reactively because they have not had the ability to predict epizootics. 
Existing models related to pneumonia in bighorn sheep focus largely on predicting 
consequences of epizootics (e.g., mortality rates and population persistence). Our model 
was designed to predict the risk of pneumonia epizootics before they happen, which no 
other model has directly done before (although see Clifford et al. [2009] and Carpenter et 
al. [2014] for models of disease transmission from allotments). If probability of 
epizootics cannot be predicted, herds cannot be separated by high and low risk to 
proactively prevent pneumonia epizootics. Proactively treating all herds as high risk 
would likely be prohibitively expensive, resulting in the general reactive management 
status quo.  
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A more proactive approach integrating wildlife health with wildlife conservation 
would lead to more effective conservation and management of wildlife populations 
(Deem et al. 2001). For more proactive management of pneumonia epizootics in bighorn 
sheep, agencies need risk assessment tools to better understand risk factors that contribute 
to pneumonia epizootics. They also need to know how to use available data to predict 
pneumonia epizootics. Models based on more limited temporal and spatial extents may 
make more precise estimates on such scales, but lose generality across larger ones. A 
general model that combines information from herds across a state would aid in 
prediction of risk at the necessary scale for state wildlife agencies to make decisions on 
how to allocate resources for proactive management. Accordingly, we analyzed epizootic 
histories and potential risk factors for 43 herds across Montana from 1979–2013 to create 
a statewide risk model for pneumonia.   
Risk Factors  
Risk of pneumonia epizootics was positively associated with greater amount of private 
land, weed control with domestic sheep and goats, history of a pneumonia epizootic in a 
herd or a nearby herd, and higher density. Based on our second generation model, risk 
also appeared to be associated with spring precipitation. Risk was not associated with 
number of allotments, herd proximity, ram:ewe ratios, winter precipitation, or herd 
origin, nor did a single risk factor affect all pneumonia epizootics based on our 
multivariate model. Although the existence of a single risk factor that we did not evaluate 
cannot be ruled out, our results agree with the findings of Miller et al. (2012) in their 
review of hypothesized risk factors of die-offs in bighorn sheep. They failed to find 
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evidence of a single etiological agent and concluded that predictive models of epizootics 
are needed based on the likely complexity of the etiology of such outbreaks.  
Risk of exposure to pathogens.—As we hypothesized, greater percentage of 
private land in and near areas used by herds of bighorn sheep was associated with 
increased risk of pneumonia epizootics by >1.5-fold per additional unit of private land. 
Risk associated with contact with domestic livestock on private land has not previously 
been quantified and tends to be neglected (Miller et al. 2011, 2012), perhaps because data 
on locations of hobby and commercial farms are generally unavailable and would be 
highly fluid through time. Exposure to sheep or goats may occur on farms on private 
lands, whereas exposure on public lands likely occurs primarily on allotments, for which 
data exist and which agencies can more directly manage. Although risk due to private 
land was slightly uncertain (the 95% CRI contained 0, however the 93% CRI did not), 
these results provide the first empirical support for the suggestions of Miller et al. (2011, 
2012) and the Wild Sheep Working Group (2012) that risk of exposure to pathogens on 
private land should receive more focus and concern. The uncertainty of this parameter at 
the 95% CRI is likely due to the probably low correlation between private land and farms 
with domestic sheep and goats, because not every parcel of private land contains 
domestic Caprinae species. Were data available, the effect of commercial and hobby 
farms could likely be estimated more precisely, yet the readily available percentage of 
private land was still predictive of risk. Examples of management actions to reduce risk 
associated with private land might include public education on separation of bighorn 
sheep and domestic sheep and goats, removal of wandering bighorn sheep in proximity to 
farms with domestic sheep or goats (Mitchell et al. 2013), or purchasing conservation 
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easements (Sells 2014). We note that the association between private land and pneumonia 
epizootics could also be related to high human densities or human disturbance (e.g., 
development) on some areas of private land. Such disturbances could increase stress and 
potentially predispose herds to pneumonia epizootics. 
Our hypothesis that risk of pneumonia epizootics increases when domestic sheep 
and goats are used for weed control in or near areas occupied by herds of bighorn sheep 
was supported, with a >3.3-fold increase in risk compared to areas or years without 
known weed control using domestic Caprinae species. To our knowledge, our results are 
the first to support the suggestion by Miller et al. (2012) and the Wild Sheep Working 
Group (2012) that such operations increase risk of pathogen exposure. Potential 
management actions to mitigate this risk include public education about separation 
between bighorn sheep and domestic sheep and goats (Mitchell et al. 2013), managing 
timing of grazing to avoid temporal overlap with bighorn sheep, or using other methods 
to control weeds that do not involve domestic sheep or goats (Sells 2014). 
As we hypothesized, risk of pneumonia epizootics increased for a herd when that 
herd or a nearby herd within 14.5 km had a history of a pneumonia epizootic. Increased 
risk for a herd after an epizootic is intuitive. Evidence suggests that pathogens become 
endemic and may cycle for years to decades within herds (Enk et al. 2001, Cassirer and 
Sinclair 2007, Cassirer et al. 2013). Further evidence suggests that whereas ewes may 
develop temporary protective immunity, this may wane after exposure to pathogens and 
does not effectively transfer to lambs, leading to ongoing outbreaks of pneumonia 
(Plowright et al. 2013). Additionally, Plowright et al. (2013) found that translocated, 
naïve adults appear to be at particularly high risk of dying from pneumonia. We 
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hypothesized that other naïve individuals in nearby herds may be at a similar risk of 
contracting pneumonia. Whereas the exposure and spread of pathogens to nearby herds 
has been hypothesized to contribute to epizootics (Onderka and Wishart 1984, George et 
al. 2008, Edwards et al. 2010), this risk has not been quantified or received as much focus 
as other hypothesized risk factors. We found that a pneumonia epizootic was associated 
with >10-fold risk of pneumonia epizootics for all herds within 14.5 km. Cassirer et al. 
(2013) reported a slight but uncertain increase in probability of pneumonia for 
neighboring populations located <20 km apart if a neighbor had any pneumonia 
mortalities that or the previous year. The reason for this difference may be attributable to 
an inclusion of short timeframes with all cases of pneumonia as opposed to our use of 
longer timeframes with high-mortality epizootics. We included histories of epizootics 
from 1979 to the end of the study given the evidence that pathogens can cycle for decades 
(Enk et al. 2001, Cassirer et al. 2013). We included only high-mortality epizootics 
because we hypothesized that pneumonia widely spread in a herd would be linked to 
more potential exposure between herds (Onderka and Wishart 1984, George et al. 2008, 
Edwards et al. 2010, Besser et al. 2013), compared to limited cases of pneumonia that 
may result in less exposure between herds. Thus, across broad temporal and spatial 
scales, we conclude that pneumonia epizootics have long-term consequences for herds 
experiencing epizootics and for neighboring herds as well. Potential actions that may 
reduce this risk could include creating lethal removal zones between infected and naïve 
herds, culling symptomatic individuals, and avoiding establishing new herds close to 
those with epizootic histories (Sells 2014). Additionally, we note that past epizootics in 
or near a herd could be predictive of future epizootics because of shared or recurring 
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conditions in an area besides pathogens (e.g., environmental factors) that could make 
herds more susceptible to pneumonia epizootics.  
Our other hypothesis that proximity to other herds, measured by Euclidean 
distance, increased risk of pathogen exposure was not supported. The global mean for 
average proximity to the 3 closest herds (22.65 km, SD = 24.27 km) was >1.56 times 
farther and highly variable compared to the maximum distance for those herds we 
considered neighbors (within 14.5 km). Although bighorn sheep are known to move 
distances comparable to our mean herd proximity (e.g., O’Brien et al. [2014] reported 
that >10% of rams forayed ≥21.7 km from core herd home ranges each summer), this 
does not mean they will necessarily come in contact with other herds. By not accounting 
for barriers to movement, Euclidean distance may misrepresent distances that bighorn 
sheep would actually travel between herds, particularly at greater distances. Additionally, 
average distance to the 3 closest herds did not account for epizootic histories, whereas 
our identified risk factor of neighboring herds with epizootic histories did. The 
hypothesis Cassirer et al. (2013) tested for distance to nearest herd with recent cases of 
pneumonia also allowed for herds at much greater distances (≤70 km) and did not have 
support. Risk therefore appears to be associated with relatively close neighboring herds 
with histories of pneumonia epizootics, not to Euclidean distance to herds in general.  
Proximity to greater number of allotments was not predictive of pneumonia 
epizootics, contrary to results reported by other researchers. Monello et al. (2001) 
reported that herds with pneumonia were closer to domestic sheep allotments than were 
herds without pneumonia. In their analysis, they included allotments at much greater 
distances compared to our area of high risk. Clifford et al. (2009) estimated risk of 
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pathogen transmission was higher where strong overlap existed between allotments and 
known bighorn sheep movements. Our result is counter-intuitive because pneumonia in 
bighorn sheep is strongly associated with exposure to domestic sheep and goats 
(Wehausen et al. 2011), which is presumably more likely on allotments. In Montana, 
however, mean number of allotments within 14.5 km of herds was only 0.54 per herd-
year (SD = 1.32). Of herd-years with ≥1 allotment (n = 134), mean number was 2.29 
allotments (SD = 1.83, max. = 14). Only 14 of the 43 herds were within 14.5 km of 
allotments with sheep or goats for at least 1 year between 1979 and 2013; of these herds, 
only 4 had pneumonia epizootics. Simple presence or absence of allotments within 14.5 
km was not predictive of epizootics upon further investigation, either. For herds that are 
close to allotments, exposure may further depend on numerous factors unique to each 
allotment, including how they are managed (e.g., timing of grazing, management of 
strays). It may also depend on the degree of actual overlap between species as suggested 
by Clifford et al. (2009), for which we had no data commensurate with the large spatial 
and temporal scales at which we worked. We suggest further, more detailed evaluation of 
how allotments might contribute to risk of pneumonia epizootics is needed before 
discarding allotments as a potentially predictive risk factor for future models.  
Risk of spread of pathogens.—Our hypothesis that relative density within a herd is 
associated with increased risk of a pneumonia epizootic was supported, lending empirical 
support to the hypotheses of other researchers (Miller et al. 1991, Monello et al. 2001, 
Clifford et al. 2009). Risk of a pneumonia epizootic increased >5-fold when herds were at 
medium density and nearly 15-fold when herds were at high density compared to when 
they were at low density. Substantial herd variation (e.g., habitat quality and estimated 
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area used by each herd) yielded incomparable absolute densities between herds, so we 
defined density as relatively low, medium, or high. More analysis on density would be 
useful in the future, including what absolute values might lead to higher risk of 
pneumonia epizootics, or if group aggregation size is predictive. Density is a component 
of risk that has previously received little attention because the positive association 
between risk of pneumonia and higher densities had not been quantified. The association 
between higher herd density and risk may appear to contradict the idea that herds of 
larger population size should be less threatened by extirpation than smaller herds 
(Woodroffe 1999, Singer et al. 2001, Cassaigne et al. 2010). Rather than reducing herd 
size only, expanding the distribution of an existing herd (e.g., through habitat 
improvements that attract animals to new areas or, potentially, short-distance transplant 
operations to unoccupied areas nearby) would also reduce density by increasing the total 
area that a herd occupies (Sells 2014).  
Ram:ewe ratios were not associated with increased risk. We chose these ratios to 
represent the likelihood that rams would wander in search of breeding opportunities, thus 
potentially encountering and spreading pathogens. Our results suggest that rams may not 
be as important vectors of pathogens in their herds as we hypothesized. Rams are known 
to make long movements (Singer et al. 2000b, DeCesare and Pletscher 2006, O’Brien et 
al. 2014), probably even more so at relatively high densities (Singer et al. 2000a, Monello 
et al. 2001). To increase risk of pneumonia for its herd, however, a wandering ram would 
have to become infected, survive long enough to come in contact with other herd 
members, and successfully transmit pathogens. These odds may be independent of 
ram:ewe ratios alone. Historically, MFWP often removed wandering rams when 
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discovered comingling with domestic sheep or goats, and this management effort may 
have further reduced risk from wandering rams in specific cases. Additionally, not all age 
classes of rams may be at greater risk of wandering. The ratio of young rams in a herd 
may be more predictive of this potential source of risk of spread of pathogens, but these 
data were only occasionally collected over the years we analyzed.  
Susceptibility to pneumonia epizootics.—We used percentage of normal spring 
(Apr‒Jun) precipitation to represent the hypothesized impact of decreased forage quality 
on susceptibility to pneumonia epizootics but found no relationship during analysis of our 
a priori models. This suggested that forage quality might not affect risk of pneumonia 
epizootics, or that percentage of normal spring precipitation may not be a suitable index 
to forage quality because it does not account for other environmental factors that also 
affect forage quality (e.g., timing of precipitation and temperature). We think it more 
likely, however, that this covariate did not have support because no a priori model 
included it alongside the other identified risk factors. Based on our a posteriori, second 
generation model, spring precipitation appeared predictive of pneumonia epizootics. 
Odds of a pneumonia epizootic were reduced by a factor of 0.41 times per unit of spring 
precipitation beyond average in the previous spring (x̅ = 100.18%, SD = 26.97%). 
Monello et al. (2001) also noted qualitative evidence for a relationship between summer 
and fall pneumonia outbreaks and lower than average precipitation. The second 
generation model could be used to predict risk of pneumonia epizootics instead of our a 
priori risk model; the effect sizes of the other 4 risk factors were comparable, with a 
largest difference in any parameter estimate of <0.4 (Tables 2.2 and 2.4). 
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We selected percentage of normal winter precipitation to represent the 
hypothesized impact of harsh winters on susceptibility to pneumonia epizootics because 
of increased energy expenditures but found no relationship. This result suggests that 
harsh winters do not increase risk of pneumonia epizootics, consistent with similar results 
of Monello et al. (2001). Alternatively, percentage of normal winter precipitation may not 
have been a suitable index for the effects of harsh winters on energy budgets of bighorn 
sheep because it did not account for patterns and timing of winter precipitation. These 
factors could be important components of winter severity but related data were 
unavailable at the scale of our analysis.  
Herds in Montana of mixed or reintroduced origin did not have higher risk of 
pneumonia epizootics than native herds. This finding contrasts with those of Monello et 
al. (2001) who evaluated a subset of herds throughout North America and hypothesized 
that sites of previous herd extirpations could continue to be risky for pneumonia based on 
characteristics of the site itself. If this were the case, reintroduced herds at sites of 
historical herd extirpations in Montana could have comparable risk to native herds. This 
could be true because MFWP has tried to avoid reintroducing herds near areas with 
domestic sheep. Alternatively, whereas we defined epizootics as events with ≥25% 
mortality, Monello et al. (2001) defined all detected pneumonia events as epizootics 
including those with <10% mortality. A difference in risk for native versus reintroduced 
herds may have been more pronounced if reintroduced herds were more likely to 
experience low-mortality pneumonia events. Reintroduced herds might also have been 
monitored more closely, providing the ability to better detect low-mortality events. 
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Overall Model 
Availability of certain data limited our ability to analyze additional hypothesized risk 
factors. Most important was the paucity of pathogen data. Presence of Mycoplasma 
ovipneumoniae or Mannheimia haemolytica may be important in predicting risk if 
sufficient data, understanding, and tests for disease agents were available. Although 
Montana had over 60 herd-years of Mycoplasma ovipneumoniae data and nearly 100 
herd-years of Mannheimia haemolytica data, more intensive, consistent efforts with 
larger sample sizes would have been needed for our analysis because so many herd-years 
were still lacking in data. Also, traditional culture-based methods for Mycoplasma 
ovipneumoniae (Besser et al. 2008) and Mannheimia haemolytica (Shanthalingam et al. 
2014) appear to miss many positive results compared to new culture-independent 
methods that detect genetic signatures of the pathogen. This suggests that analysis of 
these data for our study could lead to misleading and erroneous predictions; therefore, we 
excluded them from analysis. In addition to pathogen data, body condition data such as 
body fat levels, parasite loads, mineral levels, or blood parameters may also be of 
potential value in a future risk model (Mitchell et al. 2013).  
Evaluating our model’s capacity to predict future epizootics in Montana, or those 
occurring in other states, offers an opportunity to evaluate and improve the model. It 
would also constitute a test of the hypothesized relationships posed by our model and its 
covariates, providing an opportunity to learn more about risk factors for pneumonia 
epizootics. Our evaluation of 10 hypothesized risk factors clarified the importance of 
poorly understood risk factors in Montana to better predict risk. These risk factors could 
differ in their relative importance for herds in places unlike Montana. To maximize 
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usefulness of the model, we recommend that potential variation in risk factors should be 
tested and calibrated to local conditions as part of an adaptive approach to disease 
management. Alternative risk factors may also be important in other areas and a subject 
for future research toward development of predictive models elsewhere. The evidence, 
based on our second generation model, that spring precipitation is predictive of 
pneumonia epizootics deserves further attention in future work.  
The scope and scale of our study required data collected from numerous 
biologists, literature sources, and other agency personnel. Because misclassification of 
pneumonia epizootics could reduce precision, we excluded herd-years for which we were 
not reasonably certain were free of pneumonia epizootics. Accuracy and precision of 
spatially related covariates would be compromised if biologists were unable to delineate 
approximate distributions of herds, so we excluded herds without sufficient spatial data 
due to limited herd histories or biologist knowledge.  
The statistically rare nature of pneumonia epizootic events makes their prediction 
challenging. Pneumonia epizootics occurred in 22 out of 637 (3.45%) of the herd-years 
we analyzed. A statistical model based on such data has the potential to incorrectly 
predict epizootics (i.e., false positives) more often than correctly. Our use of decision 
curve analysis helped evaluate the extent to which managers can rely on our risk model to 
make accurate predictions, given the number of pneumonia epizootic events we observed. 
This relatively new analysis determines the net benefits of using a predictive model for 
making decisions (i.e., its usefulness; Vickers and Elkin 2006, Steyerberg et al. 2010). 
This assessment first allowed us to conclude that our top model was more useful than our 
second model. It also allowed us to evaluate whether using our model to make a decision 
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was more useful than using no model at all. If no model such as ours existed, the status 
quo decision would generally be reactive management (i.e., treat all herds as low risk) 
because herds cannot be distinguished by risk level and proactive management of all 
herds would almost certainly be too costly. To be useful, our predictive model should 
provide more correct classifications than either alternative in absence of the model.  
Decision curve analysis showed that our model is expected to be more useful than 
the status quo. For example, at a threshold probability of 0.028, our model is expected to 
provide a net increase in true positive detections of 2.390 per 100 herd-years compared to 
total reactive management. It would also provide a net reduction in false positive 
detections of 59.632 per 100 herd-years compared to total proactive management, 
meaning our model would reduce false positive predictions by 60% over completely 
proactive management. Thus, many more correct classifications will be provided by our 
model compared to fully reactive management or fully proactive management of all 
herds. This ability to reliably differentiate herds by risk level will assist managers in 
making decisions on where to direct appropriate, potentially costly proactive actions.  
An important advantage of DCA is that tolerance for false positive versus false 
negative predictions can be accounted for by selecting different threshold probabilities. 
Individual managers will have different risk tolerances when making decisions. Some 
managers will be more risk averse given the severe implications of pneumonia epizootics. 
More risk-averse managers could select a lower threshold probability to separate high 
from low risk herds. Other managers may be more risk tolerant if management actions 
would be too costly, in which case they could then select a higher threshold probability.  
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MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS  
Our model can be used to estimate risk (Table 2.5), compare and prioritize herds for 
proactive management, and simulate how potential alternative actions may reduce risk. 
The model is not only useful for predicting risk for existing herds, but for estimating 
future risk for new transplant herds as well. Our approach and results are unique because 
of the extensive spatial and temporal scales used to develop the risk model and make it 
valuable for herd-specific decisions as part of regional or statewide management of 
bighorn sheep in Montana. Used to inform decisions in a structured decision making 
framework (Mitchell et al. 2013), the model can be used to estimate herd-specific 
recommendations that best meet agency objectives given each herd’s predicted risk. 
Importantly, sophisticated software is not required; a simple spreadsheet can be used to 
calculate risk using the parameter estimates from the risk model (Table 2.2). A 
spreadsheet for a decision model similar to that shown in Mitchell et al. (2013) would 
help managers use the risk model to inform decisions. Use of both models will lead to a 
unified, transparent, and consistent approach to making proactive management decisions 
given the regional or statewide scale, while simultaneously remaining highly specific to 
each herd’s estimated risk and each manager’s goals.  
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Figure Captions 
Figure 2.1. Locations of 43 herds of bighorn sheep with 22 pneumonia epizootic events 
with ≥25% mortality between 1979 and 2013, which we used to develop a pneumonia 
risk model for Montana. We excluded several additional epizootics from our analysis. 
Numbers correspond to risk estimates in Table 2.5 and to the table for epizootics within 
the map, where a * after the herd name indicates that we excluded post-epizootic herd-
years from analysis because the herd received transplants, confounding signs of recovery.  
 
Figure 2.2. Sensitivity (dashed lines) and specificity (solid lines) at various threshold 
probabilities (p
t
’s) for 2 pneumonia risk models developed using data from 1979–2013 
for bighorn sheep in Montana. The top-ranked model (black lines) had a higher 
sensitivity and specificity than the second-ranked model (gray lines): at p
t
 = 0.0312 
sensitivity and specificity were simultaneously maximized with 81.8% sensitivity and 
80.2% specificity compared to the second-ranked model which had the same sensitivity 
and 75.3% specificity at p
t
 = 0.0288.  
 
Figure 2.3. Decision curves for 2 final a priori models considered for selection as a 
pneumonia risk model for bighorn sheep in Montana. The most supported model (black 
line) outperformed the second-best model (gray line) over much of the threshold 
probability range based on the higher net benefit overall. We selected the most supported 
model for the risk model. Using the risk model would be superior to treating all herds as 
high risk (dotted line; i.e., indiscriminate proactive management of all herds) at any 
threshold probability (p
t
) of approximately ≥0.001, and better than treating no herds as 
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high risk (dashed line at net benefit = 0; i.e., reactive management of all herds) at any 
p
t
 approximately ≤0.389. 
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Figure 2.1. 
# Herd Year
a
Mortality
b
(continued)
12 Bonner 2010 >65% 24 Gibson Lake North 1984 >25%
13 Lower Rock Creek 2010 >50% 24 Gibson Lake North 2010 >55%
14 Upper Rock Creek 2010 >60% 25 Castle Reef 1984 >25%
15 Skalkaho 2012 >70% 25 Castle Reef 2010 >55%
16 East Fork Bitterroot 2010 >50% 26 Ford Creek 1984 >25%
19 Lost Creek 1992 >50% 26 Ford Creek 2010 >40%
19 Lost Creek 2011 >60% 27 Beartooth-Sleeping Giant* 1984 >60%
20 Highland* 1995 >85% 28 Elkhorn 2008 >90%
21 Tendoy Mountains* 1994 >80% 30 Hilgards 1997 >50%
22 North Fork Birch Creek-Teton* 1984 >25% 31 Hyalite 2013 >35%
23 Deep Creek* 1984 >25% X Lower Boulder River 2000 100%
a
Herd-year of die-off, with herd-year starting 1 July the previous year through 30 June of year shown.
b
Approximate total mortality from pneumonia epizootic event. 
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Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.3.  
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Table 2.1. Data types and associated agencies we collected covariate data from to model 
risk of pneumonia epizootics for 43 herds of bighorn sheep in Montana from 1979–2013. 
Numbers represent the approximate percentage of data associated with each agency out 
of all herd-years with data for that covariate, unless otherwise indicated. Where 
applicable, we included additional herds beyond our 43 primary herds if they were within 
14.5 km of our primary herds or were 1 of the 3 closest herds. Agencies were Montana 
Fish, Wildlife and Parks (MFWP), United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), United States Forest Service (USFS), National 
Park Service (NPS), Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes (CSKT), Chippewa Cree 
Tribe (CCT), British Columbia Fish and Wildlife Branch (BCFW), Idaho Fish and Game 
(IDFG), and Wyoming Game and Fish (WGFD). Blank cells indicate data were not 
associated with these agencies. 
Data MFWP USFWS BLM USFS NPS CSKT CCT BCFW IDFG WGFD 
Allotments
a
 
 
0
b
 68 32 
      
Private land 
  
100 
       
Weed control 94 5 
   
1 
    
Neighbor risk
c
 75 2 
  
5 4 
 
4 5 5 
Herd proximity
d
 72 2 
  
5 3 2 5 7 5 
Ram:ewe ratios 93 6 
   
1 
    
Density 94 5 
   
1 
 
 
  
Herd origin 94 5 
   
1 
    
a
 Of unique allotments ≤14.5 km of herd distributions (n = 47), % associated with each agency. 
(continued) 
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(continued) 
b
 No allotments on USFWS land were ≤14.5 km of herd distributions. 
c
 Of all herds ≤14.5 km from 43 primary herds (n = 56, including 13 non-primary herds), % 
associated with each agency. 
d
 Of all herds that were 1 of 3 closest to 43 primary herds (n = 61, including 18 non-primary herds), 
% associated with each agency. Sum >100 is due to rounding. 
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Table 2.2. Parameter estimates of supported a priori models of risk of pneumonia 
epizootics for 43 herds of bighorn sheep in Montana from 1979–2013. We do not present 
models with change in Deviance Information Criterion (∆DIC) >10. Within the 
distribution of each herd plus a 14.5-km buffer from that perimeter, private land = 
percentage of private land, weed control = whether the herd biologist knew of the use of 
domestic sheep or goats for weed control, and neighbor risk = whether the herd or a 
neighboring herd had a pneumonia epizootic previously. Density = the number of 
individuals counted divided by the area of each herd’s distribution, assigned into 1 of 3 
equally sized bins of low, medium (md), and high (hi) density relative to the herd’s 
1979–2013 percentage of average. Herd effect is the among-herd variation for the herd-
level random effect. 
   
Mean SD 
      Credibility interval 
0.025 0.975 
Best model 
    
 β0  Intercept −6.269 0.761 −7.931 −4.911 
 β1  Private land 0.433 0.239 −0.028 0.910 
 β2  Weed control 1.210 0.547 0.115 2.261 
 β3  Neighbor risk 2.331 0.524 1.332 3.392 
 β4  Density(md)
 
1.660 0.728 0.309 3.180 
 β5  Density(hi)
 
2.699 0.742 1.332 4.259 
 Herd effect 0.242 0.131 0.143 0.609 
 Deviance 153.624 4.125 146.679 162.973 
(continued)  
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(continued) 
   
Mean SD 
      Credibility interval 
0.025 0.975 
Second model (∆DIC = 6.9) 
     β0  Intercept −5.705 0.709 −7.246 −4.445 
 β1  Neighbor risk 2.184 0.488 1.244 3.164 
 β2  Density(md) 1.535 0.731 0.200 3.085 
 β3  Density(hi) 2.548 0.731 1.206 4.090 
 Herd effect 0.249 0.147 0.143 0.666 
 Deviance 161.519 3.874 154.019 169.736 
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Table 2.3. Comparison of net benefits and advantages for our pneumonia risk model for 
43 herds of bighorn sheep in Montana from 1979–2013. Risk of a pneumonia epizootic is 
classified as high if it exceeds a pre-defined threshold probability (p
t
), and low otherwise. 
The net benefit at each threshold estimates the advantage of the model and can aid 
selection in p
t
 for more conservative or liberal estimation based on tolerance of false 
positives versus false negatives. 
    
 
Net benefit 
 
Advantage of model 
p
t
, ≤ Sensitivity Specificity Risk model Treat all
a
 
 
Increase 
in TP
b
 
Decrease          
  in FP
c
 
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.035 0.035 
 
3.454 0.000 
0.004 1.000 0.302 0.032 0.031 
 
3.183 29.199 
0.008 0.955 0.411 0.028 0.027 
 
2.838 20.251 
0.012 0.955 0.551 0.028 0.023 
 
2.770 40.293 
0.016 0.909 0.657 0.026 0.019 
 
2.601 44.113 
0.020 0.864 0.711 0.024 0.015 
 
2.412 45.526 
0.024 0.864 0.748 0.024 0.011 
 
2.384 53.061 
0.028 0.864 0.787 0.024 0.007 
 
2.390 59.632 
0.032 0.773 0.807 0.021 0.003 
 
2.051 54.121 
0.036 0.773 0.837 0.021 −0.002 
 
2.083 59.829 
0.040 0.773 0.847 0.021 −0.006 
 
2.054 62.951 
0.050 0.727 0.876 0.019 −0.016 
 
1.884 66.719 
0.060 0.545 0.907 0.013 −0.027 
 
1.313 63.004 
(continued) 
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(continued) 
     Net benefit  Advantage of model 
p
t
, ≤ Sensitivity Specificity Risk model Treat all
a
  
Increase 
in TP
b
 
Decrease          
  in FP
c
 
0.070 0.545 0.914 0.013 −0.038  1.258 67.369 
0.080 0.545 0.914 0.012 −0.049 
 
1.160 70.173 
0.090 0.500 0.932 0.011 −0.061 
 
1.075 72.493 
0.100 0.364 0.932 0.005 −0.073 
 
0.523 70.173 
0.200 0.273 0.977 0.004 −0.207 
 
0.392 84.301 
0.300 0.136 0.992 0.001 −0.379   0.135 88.802 
a
 Net benefits for treat all herds as high risk, a management alternative in absence of using 
our risk model to predict and separate high from low risk herds. 
b
 Increase in true positives per 100 estimates without increase in false positives compared 
to treating all herds as low risk.
 
c
 Reduction in false positives per 100 estimates without increase in false negatives 
compared to treating all herds as high risk. 
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Table 2.4. Parameter estimates of the second generation model for risk of pneumonia 
epizootics for 43 herds of bighorn sheep in Montana from 1979–2013. The Deviance 
Information Criterion (DIC) of our second generation model was 4 lower than that of our 
top-ranked a priori model. Within the distribution of each herd plus a 14.5-km buffer 
from that perimeter, private land = percentage of private land, weed control = whether the 
herd biologist knew of the use of domestic sheep or goats for weed control, and neighbor 
risk = whether the herd or a neighboring herd had a pneumonia epizootic previously. 
Density = the number of individuals counted divided by the area of each herd’s 
distribution, assigned into 1 of 3 equally sized bins of low, medium (md), and high (hi) 
density relative to the herd’s 1979–2013 percentage of average. Spring = the percentage 
of average 1 April‒30 June precipitation in the herd distribution compared to the average 
from 1980‒2010. Herd effect is the among-herd variation for the herd-level random 
effect. 
 
  
Mean SD 
Credibility interval 
  0.025       0.975 
Second generation model 
 
 β0  Intercept −6.856 0.935 −8.925 −5.288 
 β1  Private land 0.487 0.256 −0.002 1.005 
 β2  Weed control 1.300 0.577 0.144 2.409 
 β3  Neighbor risk 2.474 0.549 1.426 3.583 
 β4  Density(md)
 
1.876 0.809 0.447 3.633 
 β5  Density(hi)
 
3.066 0.843 1.577 4.884 
(continued) 
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(continued) 
 
  
Mean SD 
Credibility interval 
  0.025       0.975 
 β6  Spring −0.882 0.342 −1.587 −0.244 
 Herd effect 0.250 0.149 0.143 0.676 
 Deviance 147.583 4.593 139.739 157.825 
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Table 2.5. Estimates for risk of pneumonia epizootics as of 2012 for 42 herds of bighorn 
sheep in Montana, calculated with the pneumonia risk model we developed. The 10-year 
risk is the probability of ≥1 pneumonia epizootic occurring in 10 years if levels of risk 
factors remain unchanged. Map ID # corresponds to Figure 2.1. Within the distribution of 
each herd plus a 14.5-km buffer from that perimeter, private land = percentage of private 
land, weed control = whether the herd biologist knew of the use of domestic sheep or 
goats for weed control, and neighbor risk = whether the herd or a neighboring herd had a 
pneumonia epizootic previously. Density = the number of individuals counted divided by 
the area of each herd’s distribution, assigned into 1 of 3 equally sized bins of low, 
medium, and high density relative to the herd’s 1979–2013 percentage of average. Where 
density estimates were unavailable for 2012, we used the most recent density before that 
year.   
  Risk factors:  Pr(Epizootic): 
Map 
ID # 
Herd name 
Private 
land 
(%) 
Weed 
control 
Neig-
hbor 
risk 
Density 
 
1 yr 
(2012) 
10 yr      
(beginning 
2012) 
1 Ten Lakes 21.25 No Yes High 
 
0.203 0.897 
2 Koocanusa 6.08 No No Low 
 
0.001 0.011 
3 Kootenai Falls 25.75 No No Low 
 
0.002 0.019 
4 Berray Mountain 15.06 No No Low 
 
0.001 0.014 
5 Thompson Falls 34.96 No No Low 
 
0.002 0.025 
6 Cut-off 30.04 No No High 
 
0.031 0.271 
(continued) 
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(continued) 
  Risk factors:  Pr(Epizootic): 
Map 
ID # 
Herd name 
Private 
land 
(%) 
Weed 
control 
Neig-
hbor 
risk 
Density 
 
1 yr 
(2012) 
10 yr      
(beginning 
2012) 
7 Perma-Paradise 32.20 No No Medium 
 
0.012 0.114 
8 Hog Heaven 57.43 No No Low 
 
0.005 0.048 
9 Wildhorse Island 39.32 No No High 
 
0.041 0.340 
10 Bison Range 47.81 No No High 
 
0.052 0.412 
11 Petty Creek 36.79 No No High 0.038 0.320 
12 Bonner 46.27 Yes Yes Low 
 
0.108 0.681 
13 Lower Rock Creek 39.75 Yes Yes Low 
 
0.091 0.613 
14 Upper Rock Creek 29.33 No Yes Low 
 
0.021 0.194 
15 Skalkaho
a
 34.29 Yes No High 
 
0.109 0.685 
16 East Fork Bitterroot 10.60 Yes Yes Low 
 
0.040 0.336 
17 Painted Rocks 6.03 Yes Yes Medium 
 
0.161 0.827 
18 Garrison 54.37 Yes Yes Low 
 
0.134 0.761 
19 Lost Creek 35.73 Yes Yes Low 
 
0.081 0.571 
20 Highland 35.14 No Yes Low 
 
0.025 0.226 
21 Tendoy Mountains 26.14 No Yes Low 
 
0.019 0.178 
22 North Fork Birch Creek-Teton 27.24 No Yes Low 
 
0.020 0.183 
23 Deep Creek 26.66 No Yes Low 
 
0.020 0.181 
24 Gibson Lake North 6.04 No Yes Low 
 
0.011 0.103 
25 Castle Reef 34.46 No Yes Medium 
 
0.118 0.714 
(continued) 
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(continued) 
  Risk factors:  Pr(Epizootic): 
Map 
ID # 
Herd name 
Private 
land 
(%) 
Weed 
control 
Neig-
hbor 
risk 
Density 
 
1 yr 
(2012) 
10 yr      
(beginning 
2012) 
26 Ford Creek 21.81 No Yes Medium 
 
0.084 0.584 
27 Beartooth-Sleeping Giant 74.67 Yes Yes Low 
 
0.220 0.917 
28 Elkhorn 51.41 No Yes Low 
 
0.040 0.338 
29 Spanish Peaks 28.83 No No Medium 
 
0.011 0.103 
30 Hilgards 14.58 No Yes High 
 
0.173 0.850 
31 Hyalite
b
 26.86 No No Low 
 
0.002 0.019 
32 Upper Yellowstone 9.26 No Yes High 
 
0.151 0.806 
33 Mill Creek 17.63 Yes No Medium 
 
0.026 0.229 
34 Monument Peak 0.31 No No High 
 
0.013 0.123 
35 East Yellowstone 0.75 No No High 
 
0.013 0.125 
36 Stillwater 8.53 No No High 0.017 0.155 
37 West Rosebud 16.28 No No High  0.021 0.190 
38 Hellroaring 9.27 Yes No Low 
 
0.004 0.038 
39 Pryor Mountains 14.26 Yes No Low 
 
0.005 0.044 
40 Missouri River Breaks 44.91 Yes No High 
 
0.144 0.788 
41 Little Rockies 31.18 No No Low 
 
0.002 0.022 
42 Middle Missouri Breaks 24.57 No No Low   0.002 0.018 
a 
Had epizootic in 2012 and is now positive for neighbor risk, increasing Pr (Epizootic
10-yr
) after 2012. 
b 
Had epizootic in 2013 and is now positive for neighbor risk, increasing Pr (Epizootic
10-yr
) after 2013. 
 
 65 
CHAPTER 3:  
MODELING PROACTIVE DECISIONS TO MANAGE PNEUMONIA 
EPIZOOTICS IN BIGHORN SHEEP 
 
ABSTRACT Pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep (Ovis canadensis) are a major 
challenge for wildlife agencies due to the complexity of the disease, long-term impacts, 
and lack of tools to manage risk. We developed a decision model to facilitate proactive 
management of pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep in Montana. Our decision model 
integrates a risk model to predict probability of pneumonia epizootics based on identified 
risk factors. It uses a structured decision making (SDM) approach to analyze potential 
decisions based on predictions from the risk model, herd-specific management objectives, 
and predicted consequences and trade-offs. We demonstrated our model’s use with an 
analysis of representative herds and analyzed the recommended decisions to understand 
them clearly. We learned that proactive management for each herd was expected to 
outperform in meeting multiple, competing management objectives compared to ongoing 
status quo management. Based on sensitivity analyses, we also learned that the 
recommended decisions were relatively robust with limited sensitivity to variations in 
model inputs and uncertainties; we expect this to be the case in future analyses as well. 
Our decision model addressed the challenges of uncertainty, risk tolerance, and the multi-
objective nature of management of bighorn sheep while providing a consistent, 
transparent, and deliberative approach for making decisions for each herd. It is a unique 
tool for managing pneumonia epizootics using an accessible framework for biologists and 
managers. Our work also provides a case study for developing similar SDM-based 
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decision models, particularly for other wildlife diseases, to address challenges of making 
complex decisions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Pneumonia epizootics pose a critical challenge for management of bighorn sheep (Ovis 
canadensis; Gross et al. 2000, Cahn et al. 2011, Wehausen et al. 2011, Cassirer et al. 
2013, Plowright et al. 2013). All-age epizootic events result in high initial mortality that 
can exceed 80% (Enk et al. 2001, Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks [MFWP] 2010, Sells 
et al. 2015). Subsequent pneumonia outbreaks may continue for decades, often resulting 
in chronically low lamb recruitment which may ultimately lead to the herd’s extirpation 
(Enk et al. 2001, Cassirer and Sinclair 2007, Cassirer et al. 2013, Plowright et al. 2013, 
Sells et al. 2015). This is a particular threat for herds with low pre-epizootic abundance, 
high mortality rates during the epizootic, or that experience other random events that 
further threaten the herd with extirpation (Woodroffe 1999, Singer et al. 2000, Cassirer 
and Sinclair 2007, Cassirer et al. 2013, Plowright et al. 2013). In Montana there have 
been at least 22 epizootics of ≥25% mortality from 1979‒2013, 15 of which resulted in 
>50% mortality (MFWP 2010, Sells et al. 2015); 11 epizootics have occurred since 2008 
alone. Impacts of epizootics have included total extirpation of 1 herd and poor recovery 
in at least 3 others, despite up to 30 years of recovery efforts by Montana Fish, Wildlife 
and Parks (MFWP).  
 A lack of tools to predict and proactively manage risk of pneumonia epizootics 
often leads to reactive “crisis management” following epizootic events (Woodroffe 1999, 
Mitchell et al. 2013, Sells et al. 2015). Intensive, costly management may be required to 
help herds recover, including culling (Edwards et al. 2010), augmentation (MFWP 2010), 
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and reintroductions (Singer et al. 2000), although herds may never entirely recover to 
their former abundance and state of health (e.g., Enk et al. 2001, MFWP 2010, Cassirer et 
al. 2013, Plowright et al. 2013, Sells et al. 2015).  
Proactive management to prevent pneumonia epizootics requires tools to predict 
risk and to develop and evaluate potential proactive decisions to reduce that risk. Sells et 
al. (2015) developed an empirical model for predicting risk of pneumonia epizootics in 
Montana. The model is expected to reduce false positive and negative binary predictions 
of risk and therefore be reliable and useful for making decisions (Sells et al. 2015). 
Estimating risk accurately does not, however, automatically imply appropriate proactive 
management. Given multiple approaches and objectives for proactively managing 
pneumonia epizootics, a decision model is needed to evaluate the consequences and 
trade-offs of alternative approaches. Incorporating uncertainty in such a model is critical 
to making good decisions, particularly for relatively rare, hard-to-predict epizootic 
events. We used structured decision making (Gregory et al. 2012, Conroy and Peterson 
2013, Mitchell et al. 2013) to develop such a decision model for proactive management 
of pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep in Montana, based on a prototype developed by 
Mitchell et al. (2013). Structured decision making (SDM) is a deliberative, transparent, 
and defensible method for identifying a management action most likely to achieve 
desired outcomes. It provides a consistent approach for making decisions, allows 
inclusion of multiple competing objectives, accounts for uncertainty, and can account for 
risk tolerance (Gregory et al. 2012, Conroy and Peterson 2013). In this paper, we describe 
each general step of the SDM-based components of our decision model. We apply our 
model to hypothetical management of representative herds of bighorn sheep in Montana, 
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and analyze sensitivity of the recommended decision to potential influences that could 
affect the outcome of the analysis.  
COMPONENTS OF THE DECISION MODEL 
An SDM-based decision model breaks a decision down into its logical components: 1) 
problem statement, 2) fundamental objectives, 3) alternatives, and 4) decision analysis 
(Gregory et al. 2012, Conroy and Peterson 2013). The problem statement defines the 
decision context, fundamental objectives are the goals, and alternatives are the various 
management approaches. Decision analysis involves evaluating risk, consequences, and 
trade-offs for alternatives. Mitchell et al. (2013) presented these steps for proactively 
managing epizootics from a workshop held with MFWP managers and biologists. In 
2014 we met with a working group consisting of different MFWP biologists and 
managers to revisit the Mitchell et al. (2013) work and complete the decision model for 
pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep. We then designed the decision model in 
spreadsheet format to allow easy use by any decision-maker. Generally, the appropriate 
decision-maker is the biologist or manager responsible for each herd. Decisions therefore 
remain local and community-based within MFWP because the appropriate decision-
makers can easily use the model to evaluate potential decisions specific to their herds, 
without the SDM expertise, working groups, or meetings typically relied upon for SDM-
based decision analyses.  
Problem Statement 
We refined the problem statement from Mitchell et al. (2013) to describe the issue of 
pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep as follows: 
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MFWP has direct experience with bighorn sheep pneumonia epizootic events that 
have affected conservation and public enjoyment of bighorn sheep. MFWP currently 
has no tools for evaluating whether taking actions to proactively prevent similar 
events will produce more desirable results. MFWP wildlife managers and biologists 
need risk assessment and decision analysis tools to help prioritize and allocate 
resources to identify and manage the risk of major disease events. These tools need 
flexibility in their implementation so that decisions about bighorn sheep management 
and conservation remain local and community-based. Management actions and tools 
should be implemented with a monitoring program in a way that will reduce 
uncertainty and risk in the future. 
Fundamental Objectives 
In SDM, fundamental objectives define what a fully successful solution to the problem 
would accomplish (Gregory et al. 2012, Conroy and Peterson 2013) and are used to 
evaluate potential decisions. Each fundamental objective has an associated measurable 
attribute used to quantify the extent to which a fundamental objective is achieved by a 
solution to the problem. We refined the fundamental objectives and associated 
measurable attributes for pneumonia epizootics presented by Mitchell et al. (2013) as: 
1. Maximize the probability of herd persistence (measured as utility in terms of the 
probability of avoiding an epizootic).  
2. Minimize costs in terms of: 
a. operational costs; i.e., cost of day-to-day activities associated with 
management of bighorn sheep (measured in dollars), 
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b. personnel costs; i.e., cost of day-to-day activities associated with management 
activities (measured in days), and 
c. crisis response costs, i.e., operating costs and costs of personnel time for 
responding to an epizootic (measured in dollars). 
3. Maximize public satisfaction in terms of:  
a. viewing opportunity (measured as relatively low, medium, or high for the 
herd), and  
b. hunting opportunity (measured in the predicted number of licenses issued).  
Alternatives 
Alternatives are the potential management approaches a decision maker could use to 
solve the problem (Gregory et al. 2012, Conroy and Peterson 2013). For managing 
pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep, we developed alternatives related to risk factors 
identified in the Sells et al. (2015) risk model. Through analysis of histories of 43 herds 
in Montana from 1979‒2013, Sells et al. (2015) identified 4 risk factors positively 
associated with probability of pneumonia epizootics within herds (Table 3.1). These 
were:  
1. greater amounts of private land in a herd’s area of high risk (herd distribution plus a 
14.5-km buffer), expected to represent risk from hobby or commercial farms with 
domestic sheep or goats (“private land”),  
2. when domestic sheep or goats were known to be used to control weeds in the herd’s 
area of high risk (“weed control”),  
3. when the herd or a neighboring herd in the herd’s area of high risk had a pneumonia 
epizootic since 1979 (“neighbor risk”), and  
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4. when the within-herd density was medium or high rather than low, based on the herd-
specific variation in density from 1979‒2013 (“density”).  
We developed the alternatives based on management techniques biologists and managers 
thought would successfully reduce risk from these factors, and organized the alternatives 
in a matrix based on each risk factor and from generally least to most aggressive 
alternatives (Fig. 3.1). Decision-makers can combine these and other alternatives they 
create to evaluate unique portfolios of management actions for their specific herds in the 
decision model. Each portfolio is an alternative management approach the decision-
maker wants to analyze for their herd. Current management actions are detailed in a 
“status quo” portfolio for comparison. During the decision analysis, the status quo and 
each new portfolio are analyzed to identify which has most support for implementation. 
Representative Herds for Analysis.—We selected 3 herds representative of 
challenges of pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep for which decision-makers (the 
MFWP biologist responsible for each herd) designed portfolios and tested with our 
decision model (Fig. 3.2). The Petty Creek herd was a moderate-risk herd of >125 
individuals as of 2014. Given recent epizootics nearby, the decision-maker for Petty 
Creek was very risk averse towards pneumonia epizootics for this herd.  
In contrast, the nearby high-risk Bonner herd experienced one such epizootic in 
2010. The decision-maker for Bonner was very risk tolerant toward pneumonia epizootics 
given the recent epizootic, counts of only 11 animals in 2014, and a situation that seemed 
unlikely to improve in the near future without extensive, costly management.  
The low-risk Perma-Paradise herd was managed by the Confederated Salish and 
Kootenai Tribes on the Perma side of the herd distribution and by MFWP on the Paradise 
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side. The herd was popular with the hunting public, with the third highest number of 
applicants for licenses within a single MFWP hunting district in Montana. Due to a 
robust size of >250 individuals and the herd’s popularity, the decision-maker for the 
Paradise portion of the herd was very risk averse toward pneumonia epizootics in this 
herd.  
Portfolios for Representative Herds.—Decision-makers described the status quo 
portfolio for their herds and then developed unique portfolios for comparison. Portfolios 
were herd-specific, based on the risk factors affecting the herd and what actions the 
decision-maker thought would reduce that risk. Portfolios for Petty Creek included the:  
1. Status Quo Portfolio (including public education about risk from domestic sheep and 
goats, surveys and inventories, harvest management, and responding to wandering 
domestic sheep and goats), 
2. Transplant Removal Portfolio (focused on removing bighorn sheep through a 
transplant operation, plus public education about risk from domestic sheep and goats 
on private land, surveys and inventories, harvest management, and both removal and 
hazing of wandering domestic and bighorn sheep), 
3. Lethal Removal Portfolio (focused on lethal removal zones around the herd, plus 
public education about risk from domestic sheep and goats on private land, surveys 
and inventories, harvest management, and removal of wandering domestic and 
bighorn sheep), and  
4. Easement Portfolio (focused on conservation easements and fee title purchases to 
reduce risk from farms with domestic sheep and goats, plus improvement of range 
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health, public education about risk from domestic sheep and goats on private land, 
surveys and inventories, and harvest management).  
The decision-maker for Bonner designed portfolios to build off the status quo and 
one-another. Portfolios included the: 
1. Status Quo Portfolio (including surveys and inventories, post-epizootic monitoring, 
necropsies, public education about risk from domestic sheep and goats, removal of 
wandering domestic or bighorn sheep if found comingling, and using fencing and 
herders for weed control operations), 
2. Outreach Phase 1 Portfolio (all status quo actions plus increased outreach, with focus 
on more public education and working with the city of Missoula to end weed control 
with domestic sheep), 
3. Outreach Phase 1+2 Portfolio (including all Outreach Phase 1 actions plus additional 
public education and outreach to amend the herd’s management plan regarding 
contact between domestic and bighorn sheep), and 
4. Ideal Portfolio (including all Outreach Phase 1 + 2 actions plus an augmentation to 
increase herd size). 
Risk factors for Perma-Paradise were related to private land and density, so the 
decision-maker focused on alternatives addressing these risk factors and designed 
portfolios based on the relative level of aggression of alternatives (Fig. 3.1). Portfolios 
included the:  
1. Status Quo Portfolio (including surveys and inventories and harvest management), 
2. Least Aggressive Portfolio (including the least aggressive actions such as increased 
public education about risk from domestic sheep and goats on private land), 
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3. Moderately Aggressive Portfolio (including least and moderately aggressive actions 
such as conservation easements and fee title purchases, removal of wandering bighorn 
sheep, and increased harvest), and 
4. Most Aggressive Portfolio (including least, moderate, and most aggressive actions 
designed to reduce risk from private land and density). 
Decision Analysis 
Decision analysis in SDM includes predicting risk, estimating consequences, and 
evaluating trade-offs for each portfolio (von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986, Edwards and 
Barron 1994, Gregory et al. 2012, Mitchell et al. 2013). These steps comprise the analysis 
of the potential decisions by incorporating uncertainty, expected consequences of 
epizootics, and relative importance of fundamental objectives to quantify support for each 
portfolio.  
Predicting Risk.—The first step of a decision analysis is for the decision-maker to 
predict, for each portfolio, the probability of potential outcomes that may occur once a 
decision is made. For pneumonia epizootics, the 2 potential outcomes are that an 
epizootic either does or does not occur. Predictions can be made using expert opinion 
(e.g., Mitchell et al. 2013) or an empirical risk model (e.g., Sells et al. 2015). These 
predictions incorporate uncertainty into the decision analysis, for the timing and location 
of a pneumonia epizootic can never be known with certainty in advance (Gregory et al. 
2012, Mitchell et al. 2013). 
Our decision model used the risk model of Sells et al. (2015) to help decision-
makers predict risk for each portfolio in a risk prediction table (Table 3.2). The risk 
model yielded 1-year probability of a pneumonia epizootic, from which long-term risk 
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could be calculated for use in the decision analysis (Sells et al. 2015). To begin, the 
decision-maker entered data associated with each risk factor, R, for the status quo, then 
estimated hypothetical risk for each portfolio by predicting how the portfolio would 
affect R. Whereas Sells et al. (2015) designed most risk factors as categorical, we treated 
all R as continuous with a 0‒1 range because we expected few actions could realistically 
eliminate a risk factor entirely, i.e., completely reduce a categorical R from “1” (full 
effect) to “0” (no effect). Instead, the decision-maker estimated relative reductions in 
risk, e.g., if they thought public education about weed control with domestic sheep and 
goats would reduce that risk by 30%, they entered “0.7” for that R.  
Once the decision-maker entered data for all R, logit risk was calculated with the 
parameter values (β) from the Sells et al. (2015) risk model:  
Logit risk = β
intercept
 + β
private land
 × Rprivate land + βweed control × Rweed control + 
β
neighbor risk
 × Rneighbor risk + βdensity(md) × Rdensity(md) + βdensity(hi) × Rdensity(hi) 
and transformed to the probability of pneumonia epizootic (i.e., risk) in any 1 year by:  
Pr(Epizootic
1-yr
) = (eLogit risk) (1 + eLogit risk)⁄  
(Ramsey and Schafer 1997). Long-term risk of ≥1 epizootic occurring in the next y years 
was: 
Pr(Epizootic
long-term
) = 1 − [1 − Pr(Epizootic
1-yr
)]
y
 
(Mood et al. 1974). Finally, probability of no epizootic in that long-term timeframe was: 
Pr(No epizootic
long-term
) = 1 − Pr(Epizootic
long-term
) 
(De Veaux et al. 2012). These long-term predictions were used in the remaining decision 
analysis steps. Long-term predictions assumed R inputs remain unchanged for y years; 
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decision-makers could analyze shorter timeframes for y depending on how long they 
expected R would remain unchanged. 
Estimating Consequences.—The second step of a decision analysis is predicting 
how each potential outcome (e.g., epizootic and no epizootic) will affect the fundamental 
objectives. (E.g., if an epizootic occurred, what would be the predicted costs of crisis 
response?) Decision-makers predicted consequences of an epizootic and no epizootic for 
each fundamental objective and each portfolio in a consequence table (Table 3.3). 
Consequence tables were structured by objectives and portfolios to enable organization, 
comparison, and analysis of the predicted consequences (Gregory et al. 2012, Mitchell et 
al. 2013). 
Once the decision-maker entered each predicted consequence, the consequence 
table translated them into expected values for the decision analysis. The expected value 
(EV) of a consequence was the sum of consequences for the potential outcomes weighted 
by their probabilities: 
EV= Consequence 
Epizootic
 × Pr(Epizootic
long-term
) +  
Consequence 
No epizootic
 × Pr(No epizootic
long-term
) 
(Gregory et al. 2012). The EV was thus the combined expected consequences, accounting 
for uncertainty. An exception to this calculation for EV is if risk attitude is important to 
an analysis of consequences. In our decision analysis, risk attitude toward herd 
persistence was important because different decision-makers had various degrees of risk 
tolerance or aversion toward probability of an epizootic. To factor risk attitude into the 
EV for persistence, decision-makers selected a risk attitude curve (Fig. 3.3; Conroy and 
Peterson 2013). We designed the curves as: 
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Utility[Pr(No epizootic
long-term
)] = 1 − Pr(Epizootic
long-term
)
r
 
where r was the risk tolerance factor (0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, or 4, corresponding to very risk 
averse, risk averse, risk neutral, risk tolerant, or very risk tolerant, accordingly). The EV 
for persistence for each portfolio, Utility[Pr(No epizootic
long-term
)], accounted for the 
decision-maker’s attitude toward Pr(Epizootic
long-term
) of each portfolio.  
Next, the consequence table translated EV to normalized values, X’. Normalizing 
put EV of each objective on a 0‒1 scale to make EV of all objectives directly 
comparable. If the goal of an objective was to maximize it, 
X’ =  (x − xmin) (xmax − xmin)⁄ , 
and if to minimize,  
X’ =  (x − xmax) (xmin − xmax)⁄ , 
where x were the original EV within an objective (Gregory et al. 2012).  
Evaluating Trade-offs.—Evaluation of trade-offs is the final step of a decision 
analysis. One type of trade-off is the relative importance of each objective, since rarely 
can any single portfolio perform best on all objectives. Swing weights, wi, were the 
importance the decision-maker placed on each objective, calculated through swing 
weighting (Table 3.3; von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986, Edwards and Barron 1994, 
Gregory et al. 2012). Swing weighting accounted for the predicted difference in EV from 
worst- to best-case scenario for each objective. This swing was important because if there 
was little difference from worst- to best-case predictions for an objective (i.e., all 
predictions for an objective were about equal), it need not have influenced the decision. 
Resulting wi summed to 1.0. 
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Support for each portfolio was determined through weighted scores and overall 
scores. Weighted scores described each portfolio’s performance within single objectives, 
whereas overall scores described each portfolio’s performance over all objectives. 
Weighted scores were based on the normalized values and corresponding weight for that 
objective, calculated as X’ × wi (Table 3.3; von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986, Edwards 
and Barron 1994, Gregory et al. 2012, Mitchell et al. 2013). Portfolios with higher 
weighted scores were predicted to perform better for that objective compared to 
portfolios with lower weighted scores. The sum of weighted scores of a portfolio was its 
overall score for all objectives. Portfolios with higher overall scores had more decision 
support based on the predicted risk, predicted consequences, and weighted importance of 
each objective.  
To make a decision, the decision-maker compared overall scores and considered 
trade-offs between weighted scores. Trade-offs occur in SDM when no single portfolio 
has the highest weighted scores on all fundamental objectives. In some cases, a portfolio 
was the clear choice if no other portfolios scored closely and a lower-scored portfolio’s 
benefits did not outweigh its negative trade-offs. When ≥2 portfolios performed similarly 
well in overall scores, trade-offs were an important consideration before identifying a 
final portfolio for implementation (Gregory et al. 2012). Portfolios with slightly lower 
overall scores could have provided a better compromise in meeting multiple objectives 
reasonably well, particularly if the highest-scored portfolio did poorly on certain 
objectives. 
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RESULTS OF THE DECISION ANALYSES 
Using our decision model, decision-makers completed analyses for Petty Creek, Bonner, 
and Perma-Paradise. We analyzed whether our model was able to help identify decisions 
for each representative herd. We then analyzed sensitivity of these decisions to various 
model components.  
Model Ability to Identify Decisions 
For Petty Creek, the decision-maker chose to analyze a timeframe of 5 years; 5-year 
Pr(Epizootic
long-term
) ranged from a low of 0.038 for the Transplant Removal Portfolio to 
0.264 for the Status Quo (Table 3.2). The decision analysis resulted in high overall scores 
for 2 portfolios; either would be a good decision with slight trade-offs between each. The 
Transplant Removal Portfolio had greatest support with 0.74 overall score (Table 3.3; 
Fig. 3.4). It had the highest weighted scores for persistence, crisis response costs, and 
viewing opportunity, with trade-off of worst hunting opportunity and second-worst 
personnel costs. The Lethal Removal Portfolio scored nearly as highly at 0.71 overall 
score. Its trade-offs included lower weighted scores for objectives scoring highest in the 
Transplant Removal Portfolio, but slightly better weighted scores for personnel costs and 
hunting opportunity. 
For Bonner and Perma-Paradise, decision-makers chose 10-year timeframes to 
implement a portfolio longer before re-analyzing each herd. Results supported 1 clear 
decision for each herd. For Bonner, 10-year Pr(Epizootic
long-term
) ranged from 0.173 for 
the Ideal Portfolio to 0.719 for the Status Quo. The Ideal Portfolio had most support (0.61 
overall score; Fig. 3.4), with highest weighted scores on all objectives except operating 
and personnel costs. Low overall scores of 0.39‒0.44 for remaining portfolios were not 
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comparable. For Perma-Paradise, 10-year Pr(Epizootic
long-term
) ranged from 0.058 for the 
Most Aggressive Portfolio to 0.114 for the Status Quo. The Most Aggressive Portfolio 
had the highest overall score (0.80), with highest weighted scores for persistence, 
viewing opportunity, and hunting opportunity. Remaining portfolios with scores of 0.15‒
0.60 were not comparable.  
Sensitivity Analyses 
We evaluated performance of our model and analyzed sensitivity of results to uncertainty 
in risk predictions, risk attitude, and weights (von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986, Conroy 
and Peterson 2013).  
Sensitivity to Uncertainty.—The credibility intervals (CRIs; Kéry 2010) quantified 
uncertainty of Pr(Epizootic
long-term
) in the risk prediction table (Table 3.2). We replaced 
Pr(Epizootic
long-term
) in the consequence table (Table 3.3) with lower (10%) or upper 
(90%) CRIs in turn to test sensitivity of overall scores to this source of uncertainty.  
The analyses for our representative herds were not sensitive to the uncertainty of 
Pr(Epizootic
long-term
) from the risk model. For Petty Creek, overall scores did not change 
using lower CRIs. Overall scores for the Lethal Removal Portfolio and Status Quo 
decreased slightly using upper CRIs. For Bonner, the Ideal Portfolio remained highest 
scored; support for other portfolios barely changed. The same was true for Perma-
Paradise, with the Most Aggressive Portfolio remaining highest scored. Despite 
potentially extensive uncertainty in Pr(Epizootic
long-term
), it appears unlikely to affect the 
results of the decision analysis.  
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Sensitivity to Risk Attitude.—We compared overall scores at each different risk 
attitude (Fig. 3.3) to test the sensitivity of the recommended decisions for each herd to 
this subjective model component. Although overall scores between the highest-scored 
portfolios for Petty Creek slightly fluctuated at different risk attitudes, they remained 
almost identical. The original highest-scored portfolios retained the highest score at any 
risk attitude for both Bonner and Perma-Paradise; other portfolios were never 
comparable. The recommended decisions for the representative herds thus had minimal 
sensitivity to risk attitude. 
Sensitivity to Weights.—We also tested sensitivity of the recommended decisions 
for each herd to weights on objectives (wi). To do so, we varied wi from 0‒1 for an 
objective while holding remaining wi at their original values to identify values for 
“switchover,” the wi at which the recommended portfolio changed (von Winterfeldt and 
Edwards 1986). 
For Petty Creek, the Transplant Removal and Lethal Removal portfolios nearly 
always retained the highest overall scores regardless of wi (Fig. 3.5). Switchover to the 
Lethal Removal Portfolio occurred for wpersistence ≤0.10 or wpersonnel costs ≥0.34. 
Switchover to this portfolio also occurred at whunting opportunity ≥0.34 and to the Easement 
Portfolio at ≥0.53. Results were not sensitive to remaining wi. Altogether, overall scores 
between these portfolios remained close, meaning changes in wi would not result in a 
clearly superior decision.  
Bonner and Perma-Paradise were insensitive to wi. For Bonner, switchover from 
Ideal to Status Quo occurred in the unlikely scenarios of wpersistence ≤0.07, woperating costs 
≥0.41, or wpersonnel costs ≥0.43. For Perma-Paradise, switchover to Moderately Aggressive 
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occurred in the unlikely scenario of wpersonnel cost ≥0.55, and to Least Aggressive if 
woperating cost ≥0.58 or wpersonnel cost  ≥0.72. The recommended decisions for the 
representative herds therefore had minimal sensitivity to wi. 
DISCUSSION 
We created a decision model to facilitate proactive decisions for managing risk of 
pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep. We found that proactive decisions were 
recommended over the status quo management for each representative herd we analyzed. 
The portfolios that scored highest for each herd were predicted to meet fundamental 
objectives better than any other portfolios decision-makers developed and analyzed for 
their herds. We were not surprised that the generally more aggressive types of portfolios 
performed well for Petty Creek and Perma-Paradise given the decision-makers’ risk 
aversion towards pneumonia epizootics. We were uncertain what to expect from the 
analysis for Bonner due to the herd’s recent epizootic event and the decision-maker’s 
higher risk tolerance towards pneumonia epizootics as a result, yet the more aggressive 
portfolio was also recommended. If this portfolio were excluded from the analysis, (e.g., 
if it was deemed too expensive), however, remaining portfolios would have 
approximately equal support. The decision may then be the Status Quo; we expected this 
would be true in a herd with few ways to improve consequences for most objectives after 
a recent epizootic.  
One of the greatest challenges for good decision-making is addressing 
uncertainty. For pneumonia epizootics, there is extensive uncertainty about timing and 
location of relatively rare epizootic events. We factored this uncertainty into the decision 
model with the Sells et al. (2015) risk model so that probability of pneumonia epizootic 
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was used throughout the decision analysis. Sells et al. (2015) used decision curve analysis 
to analyze the reliability of their model for making decisions by exploring the balance 
between false positives and negatives at various thresholds for binary risk level (Vickers 
and Elkin 2006, Steyerberg et al. 2010, Sells et al. 2015). They found that the risk model 
is expected to be reliable for making decisions, leading us to be confident in its use in our 
decision model. The decision analysis may still be sensitive to a decision-maker’s 
estimates for effects of portfolios on risk (e.g., R inputs in Table 3.2), yet changes to 
these estimates are unlikely to influence the analysis unless overall rank or magnitude of 
estimated risk across portfolios change (von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986).  
Our sensitivity analyses of results for the representative herds revealed that the 
recommended decisions were not sensitive to uncertainty for risk predictions, risk 
attitude, and weights. The final decision is important rather than the exact values within a 
decision model, and changes to inputs often have limited effect on the decision unless 
changes are large (von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986). Based on results from our 
representative herds, we expect the decision analyses from our model to generally be 
insensitive to any of these components, with only slight variations in overall scores when 
an analysis has >1 highly scored portfolio. When this is the case, trade-offs between 
multiple highly scored portfolios are the important consideration rather than the overall 
scores alone. 
Our decision model is a unique tool that accounts for the important, inherent 
uncertainty surrounding timing and location of pneumonia epizootic events while 
simultaneously making explicit the many considerations needed to make good proactive 
decisions. It also exemplifies the role of SDM-based decision models for managing 
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wildlife, particularly for managing disease. An adaptive management approach will 
improve the model through learning from implementation of each decision (Gregory et 
al. 2012, Conroy and Peterson 2013). A monitoring program on the efficacy of proactive 
actions and occurrence of future epizootics would provide data to continuously refine the 
model and future decisions, yielding increasingly effective proactive management of 
pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep.  
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Figure Captions 
Figure 3.1. Example management alternatives to address risk factors for pneumonia 
epizootics in bighorn sheep. Actions range from least to most aggressive and correspond 
to risk factors identified by Sells et al. (2015).  
 
Figure 3.2. Location of several herds of bighorn sheep in western Montana. Decision-
makers evaluated potential proactive management actions for pneumonia epizootics for 
Petty Creek, Bonner, and Perma-Paradise with our decision model.  
 
Figure 3.3. Risk attitude curves for probability of pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep 
for the decision model we developed. After a decision-maker selected a curve for their 
tolerance toward risk of pneumonia epizootics, the decision model calculated 
corresponding utilities for each portfolio for the fundamental objective of maximizing 
persistence in the consequence table (Table 3.3). 
 
Figure 3.4. Overall scores for portfolios (i.e., potential decisions) decision-makers 
evaluated to proactively manage risk of pneumonia epizootics in 3 herds of bighorn sheep 
in Montana. Scores were calculated using the decision model we developed; higher 
overall scores indicated greater support. 
 
Figure 3.5. Sensitivity of decisions recommended by our decision model to weight on 
objectives, wi, for managing risk of pneumonia epizootics in the Petty Creek herd of 
bighorn sheep in Montana. We varied a wi from 0‒1 while holding other wi at original 
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values. Lines correspond to the various portfolios we evaluated, with higher overall 
scores indicating greater support. Where lines cross, the recommended decision changed, 
though similar overall scores indicated similar support for either portfolio. Our results 
had limited sensitivity to wi.  
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Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.4.  
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Figure 3.5. 
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Table 3.1. Parameter estimates of the risk model (Sells et al. 2015) for pneumonia 
epizootics for bighorn sheep. Within the herd distribution plus a 14.5-km buffer from that 
perimeter, β
private land
 is percentage of private land, β
weed control
 is known use of domestic 
sheep or goats for weed control, and β
neighbor risk
 is whether the herd or a neighboring herd 
had a pneumonia epizootic previously. β
density(md)
 and β
density(hi)
 are herd-specific at low, 
medium (md), and high (hi) density relative to the herd’s 1979–2013 percentage of 
average.  
 
Parameters Mean SD 
  Credibility interval 
0.025 0.975 
βintercept  -6.269 0.761 -7.931 -4.911 
βprivate land 0.433 0.239 -0.028 0.910 
βweed control 1.210 0.547 0.115 2.261 
βneighbor risk 2.331 0.524 1.332 3.392 
βdensity(md)
 
1.660 0.728 0.309 3.180 
βdensity(hi)
 
2.699 0.742 1.332 4.259 
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Table 3.2. Risk prediction table from our decision model showing estimated probability of pneumonia epizootics, Pr(Epizootic), for 
portfolios evaluated for the Petty Creek herd of bighorn sheep. Decision-makers predicted how portfolios (i.e., potential decisions) 
would affect the risk factors identified by the Sells et al. (2015) risk model. The table provided corresponding Pr(Epizootic) for 1-yr 
and long-term timeframes (5 years for Petty Creek). 
  
R Inputs (Predicted Impact on Risk Factors):  Pr(Epizootic)  Pr(Epizootic
long-term
) 
CRI
a
: 
Portfolio 
Private 
Land: 
Weed Control                
(0-1): 
Neighbor Risk                  
(0-1): 
Density                                      
(Lo, Md, or Hi, 0-1)
b
: 
  1-year
c
 Long-
term
d
 
  10% 
CRI 
90% 
CRI 
Status Quo 50% (N/A, 0) 15% impact (0.15) Hi, 90% impact (0.90) 
 
0.059 0.264 
 
0.149 0.430 
Transplant Removal 36% (N/A, 0) 5% impact (0.05) Md, 60% impact (0.60) 
 
0.008 0.038 
 
0.020 0.071 
Lethal Removal 43% (N/A, 0) 10% impact (0.10) Md, 80% impact (0.80) 
 
0.015 0.072 
 
0.038 0.132 
Easement 45% (N/A, 0) 15% impact (0.15) Hi, 65% impact (0.65)   0.027 0.128   0.071 0.217 
a 
80% credibility intervals quantify uncertainty for Pr(Epizootic
long-term
). 
b 
Lo =  low, md = medium, hi = high, based on herd-specific range in density from 1979‒2013. 
c
 Pr(Epizootic
1-yr
) = (eLogit risk) (1 + eLogit risk)⁄ , where  Logit risk = ∑ β
i
 × Ri, based on R inputs and β from the risk model (Table 3.1). 
d 
Pr(Epizootic
long-term
) = 1 − [1 − Pr(Epizootic
1-yr
)]
y
for y years.
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Table 3.3. Consequence table showing the decision analysis for managing risk of pneumonia epizootics for the Petty Creek herd of 
bighorn sheep. The decision-maker predicted consequences for 2 potential outcomes (epizootic and no epizootic). The Transplant 
Removal and Lethal Removal portfolios scored highly. Trade-offs, based on weighted scores, are an important consideration in a 
decision analysis before selecting a final portfolio to implement.  
Fundamental 
Objective: 
Persistence Operating 
Costs 
Personnel 
Costs 
Crisis 
Response 
Viewing 
Opportunity 
Hunting 
Opportunity   
Goal: Maximize Minimize Minimize Minimize Maximize Maximize 
 Measurable 
Attribute & Scale: 
Utility 
[Pr(No epiz.
long-term
)]
a
 
Cost, $K,   
long-term 
Person-days, 
long-term 
Cost, $K,   
long-term 
1=lo, 2=md, 
3=hi
b
 
Licenses, #, 
long-term   
Portfolio: Consequences, Epizootic: Pr(Epizooticlong-term)
c
: 
Status Quo 0.00 37.50 70.00 45.00 2.00 20.00 0.26 
Transplant Removal 0.00 75.00 180.00 45.00 2.00 12.50 0.04 
Lethal Removal 0.00 75.00 125.00 45.00 2.00 20.00 0.07 
Easement 0.00 787.50 370.00 45.00 2.00 50.00 0.13 
(continued) 
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(continued) 
Fundamental 
Objective: 
Persistence Operating 
Costs 
Personnel 
Costs 
Crisis 
Response 
Viewing 
Opportunity 
Hunting 
Opportunity 
 
Portfolio: Consequences, No Epizootic: Pr(No epiz.long-term)
d
: 
Status Quo 0.28 37.50 70.00 0.00 3.00 40.00 0.74 
Transplant Removal 0.56 75.00 180.00 0.00 3.00 25.00 0.96 
Lethal Removal 0.48 75.00 125.00 0.00 3.00 40.00 0.93 
Easement 0.40 787.50 370.00 0.00 3.00 100.00 0.87 
Portfolio: Expected Values (EV)
e
:   
Status Quo 0.28 37.50 70.00 11.87 2.74 34.73 
 
Transplant Removal 0.56 75.00 180.00 1.73 2.96 24.52 
 
Lethal Removal 0.48 75.00 125.00 3.26 2.93 38.55 
 
Easement 0.40 787.50 370.00 5.75 2.87 93.61 
 
(continued) 
  
 
 99 
(continued) 
Fundamental 
Objective: 
Persistence Operating 
Costs 
Personnel 
Costs 
Crisis 
Response 
Viewing 
Opportunity 
Hunting 
Opportunity 
 
Portfolio: Normalized Values (X')
f
:   
Status Quo 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 
 
Transplant Removal 1.00 0.95 0.63 1.00 1.00 0.00 
 
Lethal Removal 0.72 0.95 0.82 0.85 0.85 0.20 
 
Easement 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.60 1.00   
 
Weighted Scores
g
:   
Portfolio:     Weights (wi)
h
: 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.19 Overall Score
i
: 
Status Quo 0.00 0.16 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.36 
Transplant Removal 0.21 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.00 0.74 
Lethal Removal 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.04 0.71 
Easement 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.19 0.44 
(continued)        
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(continued) 
a 
Consequences for persistence are based on the decision-maker’s risk attitude toward Pr(Epizootic
long-term
) (Fig. 3.3). 
b 
Low (lo), medium (md) or high (hi) density. 
c 
Pr(Epizootic
long-term
) is calculated with the Sells et al. (2015) risk model (Tables 3.1 and 3.2). 
d 
Pr(No epizootic
long-term
) = 1 ‒ Pr(Epizootic
long-term
). 
e 
Expected values, EV = ConsequenceEpizootic × Pr(Epizooticlong-term) + ConsequenceNo epizootic × Pr(No epizooticlong-term). 
f 
Normalized values, X' = (x ‒ xmin)/( xmax ‒ xmin) if the goal is to maximize, (x ‒ xmax)/( xmin ‒ xmax) if minimize. 
g 
Weighted scores = X' × wi and are the final scores for the consequences for each objective, for each portfolio. 
h 
Weights, wi, are based on swing weighting. 
i 
Overall scores are summed across each row; higher scores have more support. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1. List of 30 a priori models of risk of pneumonia epizootics for 43 herds of 
bighorn sheep in Montana from 1979–2013. Model number, effective number of 
parameters (pD), and Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) are provided, with models 
sorted by ∆DIC compared to the top-ranked model. Within the distribution of each herd 
plus a 14.5-km buffer from that perimeter, allotments = # federally managed sheep and 
goat allotments, private land = percentage of private land, weed control = whether the 
herd biologist knew of the use of domestic sheep or goats for weed control, and neighbor 
risk = whether the herd or a neighboring herd had a pneumonia epizootic previously. 
Herd proximity = the average distance to the 3 closest herds. Ram:ewe ratios = ratio of 
rams to ewes counted during surveys. Density = the number of individuals counted 
divided by the area of each herd’s distribution, assigned into 1 of 3 equally sized bins of 
low, medium (md), and high (hi) density relative to the herd’s 1979–2013 percentage of 
average. Winter = percentage of normal November‒March precipitation in the herd 
distribution. Spring = percentage of normal April‒June precipitation in the herd 
distribution. Herd origin = whether the herd was native, mixed, or reintroduced. 
# Model     pD DIC  ∆DIC 
19 Private land + Weed control + Neighbor risk + Density 8.5 162.1 0.0 
14 Neighbor risk + Density 7.5 169.0 6.9 
21 Private land + Neighbor risk + Herd origin 7.9 178.8 16.7 
3 Neighbor risk 4.5 179.3 17.2 
(continued) 
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(continued) 
# Model     pD DIC  ∆DIC 
13 Neighbor risk + Winter 5.6 181.4 19.3 
15 Weed control + Density 11.8 183.7 21.6 
22 Weed control + Proximity + Density + Herd origin 15.0 183.9 21.8 
18 Private land + Proximity + Density 12.5 184.6 22.5 
20 Private land + Weed control + Proximity 8.1 186.9 24.8 
12 Private land + Proximity 8.0 192.1 30.0 
4 Weed control 8.2 192.5 30.4 
7 Density 14.1 193.6 31.5 
16 Weed control + Spring 14.1 194.4 32.3 
2 Private land 8.7 197.2 35.1 
23 Weed control + Proximity + Winter + Spring 17.1 197.7 35.6 
25 Proximity + Density + Spring 26.5 197.8 35.7 
5 Proximity 8.5 198.1 36.0 
9 Spring 12.3 198.6 36.5 
8 Winter 7.9 199.1 37.0 
10 Herd origin 10.9 202.5 40.4 
27 Allotments + Neighbor risk + Density 54.5 1055.3 893.2 
26 Allotments + Private land + Proximity + Spring 58.4 1070.8 908.7 
11 Allotments + Private land 56.2 1081.2 919.1 
1 Allotments 57.2 1084.6 922.5 
29 Allotments + Proximity + Winter + Herd origin 67.7 1096.0 933.9 
24 Neighbor risk + Rams + Spring 59.1 1637.4 1475.3 
(continued) 
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(continued) 
# Model     pD DIC  ∆DIC 
17 Private land + Rams + Density + Winter 70.3 1659.1 1497.0 
6 Rams 61.7 1661.4 1499.3 
30 Global (all 10 covariates) 116.3 2507.9 2345.8 
28 Allotments + Weed control + Rams 108.3 2540.0 2377.9 
 
